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In response to pressure from irrigation advocates, the
U.S. Congress passed the Carey Land Act in 1894.
Intended
to promote the construction of irrigation projects in the
western states, the Carey Act offered up to one million
acres of federal land to each state that irrigated and
settled those lands.
In 1895, the Montana legislature
approved a law to administer the Carey Act in the state.
Through the Arid Land Grant Commission (1895-1903), and the
Carey Land Act Board (1903-1965), Montana created three
irrigation districts under the Carey Act and patented 92,000
acres from the federal government.
The Billings Bench district near the city of Billings was
the first successful Carey project in the state.
In 1920,
the construction company transferred title of the Billings
Bench project to the water users on the over 13,000-acre
district.
The largest Carey project in the state, the
Valier district, covered 70,000 acres.
The other successful
project was the Big Timber district, located in Sweet Grass
County.
Private construction companies built all three
projects and made money by selling water rights on the land
purchased by settlers.
Although it completed three successful projects, the Carey
Land Act Board (CLAB) suffered from lack of state funding
and found it difficult to attract investors for Carey
projects.
The lack of state stream-flow records to gauge
water availability for the projects also created problems
for the CLAB.
Overestimation of available water supplies
and underestimation of the high cost of constructing large
irrigation projects led to the bankruptcies of several
companies and made investors wary of Carey districts.
Records of the Arid Land Grant Commission and the Carey
Land Act Board are located in the Montana State Archives at
the Montana Historical Society in Helena.
These records
include letters, financial statements, project reports,
minutes and engineering reports.
Much of the research
included in this paper is from these records.
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Chapter 1
"a small oasis in a vast semi-arid plain"

The westward movement of settlers has characterized
American history since the first Europeans landed in
Virginia.

Farmers,

west to find land,

trappers, miners and adventurers moved
furs, gold and excitement.

Individually,

most were ordinary people who just wanted to find a better,
or perhaps an easier,
pioneers,

life.

But, as a group,

especially the farmers,

for many Americans.

these

took on a romantic aura

They came to represent the best of

America--they were virtuous, honest, hardworking,

and

carried the future of the nation on their sturdy backs.
However far removed from reality,

this Jeffersonian ideal of

the yeoman farmer was eagerly adopted by reformers in the
late 19th century who were searching for an antidote to the
corruption and vice they found in American industrial
society.
To many reformers of the Progressive Era, the continued
creation of small farms equaled the preservation of American
society.

Americans "still believed that the family farm was
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the foundation of a healthy economy and essential to the
perpetuation of democratic institutions and civic
responsibility.'"
and crime ridden,

As Eastern cities became more crowded
reformers dreamt of moving the "surplus"

population of the cities onto the wholesome land of the west
where these people could tend the earth and live the simple,
virtuous life of Thomas Jefferson's republican farmer.

But,

by the 1380s the extension of the agricultural frontier was
beginning to slow as farmers ventured into what had once
been called "The Great American Desert."
and sheep prospered in this region,

Although cattle

farmers struggled.

In a

land where rainfall averaged less than 2 0 inches per year,
most forms of agriculture could not survive without
irrigation.

Thus,

for those who believed that the future of

the United States depended on the continuation of the
agricultural frontier into the semi-arid region west of the
100th meridian,

irrigation became an obvious necessity.

Without irrigation,
stop; the mythical

settlement of the western lands would
"safety v a l v e " would close and the

troubles of American cities would continue to escalate.
In addition to social reformers,

the irrigation

movement also attracted those who hoped to benefit
materially from the Anglo settlement of the west.

Unlike

the Progressives, who wanted to increase arable land to cure
^Donald Pisani, "Reclamation and Social Engineering in
the Progressive E ra , " Agricultural History 57 (January
1983), p. 46-48.
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the social ills of the nation,

boosters in the western

states and territories wanted to construct irrigation
projects to promote stable farms that would strengthen their
local economies.

A successful irrigation project near a

town could revitalize a community by bringing in new people
and more money.

Irrigated farmland also created a more

substantial tax base for the state.

Whether motivated by

the vision of a utopia of small farmers or by greed, many
western businessmen, politicians and farmers supported the
development of irrigation systems in the region:
Individual farmers, private businesses and community
groups constructed the first irrigation systems in the west.
But, by the 1880s,

irrigationists like William E. Smythe,

publisher of Irrigation Acre, and Elwood Meade,
Engineer of Wyoming,

State

realized that private capital was not

establishing enough reclamation projects.

Although private

companies did build some canal systems in the hopes of
achieving large returns, most of these projects were not
successful.

The water in the projects was expensive, water

users and water suppliers quarreled over prices,

and many

companies failed because they could not settle their lands
quickly enough.

According to historian Richard White,

1900 "90 percent of the private canal companies
financial distress.
their water users.

[were]

Most sold out, often on credit,
Such financial failures did not

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to

by
in

encourage further private investment in irrigation
systems .
In an attempt to help farmers,

and in response to

pressure from reformers and western leaders, Congress passed
the Desert Land Act in 1877,

This new act gave settlers the

right to claim up to 640 acres of arid lands, which they
could purchase for one dollar an acre after three years if
they "improved" a portion of the land by conducting water to
it.

Designed to attract settlers,

this law was more

beneficial to ranchers who exploited its vague wording to
add more land to their holdings.’ Westerners who attempted
to lure small farmers to their states and territories feared
that if ranchers continued to expand their holdings,

these

states would become little more than cattle baronies without
the stable, prosperous communities that yeoman farmers would
create.

Richard Roeder,

in Montana,

in his study of the Progressive Era

found this desire to make farming more dominant

expressed in Montana as well as in other states.
"Montanans," he argued,

"believed that the farm community

would free them from a dependence upon grazing as well as
m i n i n g ... There existed a feeling that land was too valuable
to use five acres to feed a cow and that a boundless and
’Richard White, "It's Your Mis fortune and None of Mv
Own":
A History of the American W e s t . {Norman and London:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 403.
’Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development.
(Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968),
p . 638-641.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
more stable prosperity would prevail when all arable and
irrigable land was put into small farms.
Representatives from the western states recognized that
they needed more federal assistance to build the bigger
irrigation projects necessary to water the vast acres of
land not adjacent to a water source.

As the west

experienced a series of droughts in the 1880s,

irrigation

advocates began to call for regional conferences to decide
how to obtain the needed irrigation works.

In 1891 the

First Irrigation Congress met in Salt Lake City to discuss a
strategy for pursuing this goal.

At the conference,

delegates from states and territories throughout the west
adopted a resolution calling on the federal government to
cede land to the states to finance irrigation.^

Federal

cession would provide an incentive to develop irrigation
projects because it could mean a great increase in the
state's taxable land.

Cession was a half-way measure

between direct federal aid, which many strongly opposed,

and

strictly private construction of irrigation systems.
Like other states and territories in the arid west,
Montana had its own boosters and promoters who supported
irrigation as a way to increase the population and
prosperity of the state.

According to Richard Roeder,

"Richard Brown Roeder, "Montana in the Early Years of
the Progressive Period,"
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1971.
p. 86.
^Gates, p. 648.
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"There was common agreement that federal aid was essential
to bringing about a greater future because private capital
was not equal to the task of building the necessary canals
and reservoirs to utilize the state's waters."”

Montanan

Robert Sutherlin embraced this attitude toward irrigation.
Editor of The Rocky Mountain Husbandman from 1875 to 1926,
Sutherlin,

like others of this time,

virtue of the yeoman farmer.
harsh climate,

firmly believed in the

He argued that, because of the

in order for farmers to succeed in Montana,

they needed the security of irrigation.'
irrigation projects were expensive.

But large

Most of the land that

could be cheaply irrigated in the state had already been
filed on by 1882.’ Many investors who might have been
willing to gamble on irrigation projects believed they could
make more money by simply grazing cattle and sheep upon the
land.®

Large irrigation projects were beyond the scope of

small farmers and private corporations,
other westerners,

so Sutherlin,

like

looked to the federal government for

aid/"

’Roeder, p. 73.
’Frank R. Grant, "Embattled Voice for the Montana
Farmers:
Robert Sutherlin's Rocky Mountain Husbandman,"
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Montana, p
169 .
’Grant, p. 173.
’Grant, p. 17 5
'"Grant, p. 177
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In response to pressure from irrigation supporters, the
U.S. Congress passed the "Carey Land Act" on 18 August 1894.
Under the Carey A c t , which was named for Senator Joseph M.
Carey of Wyoming who introduced the bill,

the federal

government agreed to grant up to one million acres of public
land to each western state if the state would reclaim and
settle that land within ten years.

An essential part of the

legislation involved settlement ; the act specified that the
states could sell Carey land in parcels no larger than 160
acres.

Congress expressly sought to benefit farmers, not

large ranchers or land speculators.
To apply for Carey land,

the state first submitted maps

and plans to show how reclamation would proceed on the
specified a r ea .
plans,

If the federal government approved the

it then "segregated" the land and permitted the state

to begin its reclamation work.

After the state adequately

"reclaimed" and settled the area,

the federal government

then granted the state a "patent" for the land, and
officially transferred ownership to the state, which then
sold the land to settlers.

In later amendments to the Carey

Act in 1896 and 1901, Congress allowed the Secretary of the
Interior to issue patents when an "ample supply of water is
actually furnished upon the land...without regard to
settlement or cultivation," and extended the original 10year deadline for reclamation;

the state was given 10 years

from the time of segregation approval to complete irrigation
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and reclamation,

but the Secretary of the Interior could

extend this deadline at “his discretion" .

The state could

build the irrigation system itself or contract with a
construction company to do the work.
Many states did not take greater advantage of the Carey
Act because the act did not provide any funds for the state.
The Carey Act was really government-sponsored private
reclamation,

and,

"Private capital had taken up and improved

the most likely projects which did not require too large an
investment and promised quick return in water rents or in
accelerating land p r i c e s . T h e

donation of federal land

helped defray the cost of building Carey projects,

but the

act did not help states or companies with the money needed
to start projects and maintain them until they drew in
settlers who would pay for the systems.

Like other states,

Montana found it difficult to attract investors willing to
finance the construction of irrigation projects under the
Carey Act since the act offered nothing in funding and no
guarantee for the private investment.
Because most states could not take full advantage of
the Carey Act due to the financial inadequacies of the
legislation,

irrigation supporters demanded more government

“State of Montana, Rules and Regulations of the Carey
Land Act Board of the State of Mon ta na . (Helena:
State
Publishing Company, 1909), p. 3-5.
Robbins, Roy M ., Our
Landed Heritage:
The Public Domain, 1776-1936. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 328-329.
“Gates, p. 651.
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aid.

Under the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, Congress

provided the initial funds to build dams and canals;
settlers on the reclamation projects eventually repaid the
building expenses.
satisfy investors,

Since the government did not have to
it did not have to worry about immediate

returns on the investment of constructing large projects.
The Congress had augmented the Carey Land Act with new and
better legislation that would create hundreds of irrigation
projects throughout the west.
States continued to take advantage of the Carey Act,
however, well after it was "replaced" by the Newlands act.
In Montana,

the Carey Land Act Board,

created by the state

legislature to administer the act, continued to function
until 1965.

Although it sometimes took several decades for

the Montana board to complete its irrigation systems,

three

projects were successful and provided irrigated land for
hundreds of farmers.

The Carey Land Act projects were not

as large as the federal projects in the state, but they did
demonstrate that private capital under state supervision
could construct substantial irrigation works.

Although the

Carey Land Act never fulfilled the grand dreams of the 19th
century irrigationists, it did satisfy some of these
promoters and reformers.
When Sutherlin,

the ardent irrigation supporter,

visited Montana's Valier project in 1917, he discovered,
his biographer wrote,

in that "embryonic irrigation
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community the symbol of his life's work.

'To the man who

has devoted his life to the securing of water on the land in
his dear loved Montana h o m e . ..this great system is an
indescribable joy,' he exclaimed.

His hopes were affirmed

by a small oasis in a vast semi -arid plain.
The "oasis" that so pleased Sutherlin was an irrigation
project started and completed under the Carey Land Act of
1894 .

^Grant, p. 421-22.
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Chapter 2
The Arid Land Grant Commission,

1895-1903

Montana leaders eagerly accepted the chance to create
new irrigation systems and bring more lands onto the state
taxrolls; they saw the Carey Act as a way to increase the
population and wealth of the state.
Congress passed the Carey Act,

Six months after

the Montana legislature

approved a law creating the Arid Land Grant Commission
(ALGO

to administer the act within Montana.

The Commission's duties included approving land for
cession requests and supervising irrigation projects on
those lands.

Since the legislators did not want to commit

state funds for building vast irrigation systems,

the state

law provided that the Commission would pay the cost of
reclaiming Carey lands "by the issuance of warrants to the
person or persons,
such work,

corporation or corporations undertaking

for the full amount of said contract price."

These warrants,

or bonds, bore a six percent interest and

constituted a lien, or first mortgage,

on the land, water

11
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rights, and improvements.'

The Commission would then figure

the value of each parcel of Carey land with water right to
be "the equitable proportion it shall bear to the total cost
of reclamation of

[the] district," plus twenty percent of

that value added to the t otal.

The ALGC was to place the

extra twenty percent into a state fund to help pay for the
construction of future Carey projects.

The six percent

interest accrued from the date the Commission issued the
bonds and was added to the price of the land and appurtenant
water rights.

Contractors could only receive payment for

the bonds when settlers purchased the reclaimed land in that
irrigation district.^

The state would charge settlers a

minimal price for the land itself; the higher charge was for
the inseparable water r i g ht .
Under this law, the Commission was responsible for
issuing the bonds and warrants that would be used to pay for
the irrigation projects.

But this system created an awkward

and delayed form of payment that caused problems for the

'State officials used the words "bond" and "warrant"
interchangeably to mean the shares sold in an irrigation
project.
Officials used the more precise meaning of
"warrant" to refer to promissory notes given to merchants or
other individuals (including ALGC members) as payment for
goods or services; individuals could redeem these warrants
after the Commission sold the land in the district through
which the warrants were issued.
^State of Montana, Irrigation Law of the State of
Montana:
The Carev A c t . Report of Arid Land Grant
Commission and Recommendations of Governor Smith Regarding
Irrigation. (Helena:
State Publishing Company, 1897), p. 810 .
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ALGC from the beginning.

The Commission could not guarantee

payment of the bonds and investors were reluctant to finance
such risky projects.

Poor economic conditions created by

the Panic of 1893 increased the problems the Commissioners
faced in trying to interest investors in Montana Carey
projects.
If it could not sell its bonds,

the Commission had to

rely on the small yearly allowance provided by the state.
As a later report on the Arid Land Grant Commission
admitted,
purpose

"the small appropriation set aside for this

[reclamation and settlement], namely one thousand

($1,000.00) dollars per year,

so handicapped the commission

as to make it impracticable to proceed upon or even to
initiate so gigantic an u n d e r t a k i n g . R e l u c t a n t
new debts for the state,

to create

the legislature refused to provide

for anything beyond nominal expenses to aid in the
development of Carey projects and the settlement of Carey
lands.

Even before the members of the Commission began

their duties,

they were severely handicapped by the State's

Carey legislation.
Governor John E. Rickards appointed the first members
of the ALGC in 1895.

In his Governor's Address earlier that

year, Rickards had impressed upon the people of Montana his
belief that the state needed to encourage federal aid for

^Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act Board of
the State of M o n ta na . 1909, p. 6.
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reclamation.

"Private capital," he stated,

the burden of reclaiming such vast tr ac t s ,

"is not equal to
I am firmly

convinced that it is the duty of the general government to
aid in adapting the arid belt to the purposes of
civilization,

and that appropriations for this purpose

should be made."

Rickards commended the Congress for

passing the Carey Act,

calling it "The most practicable way

of dealing with the irrigation question at the present
t ime.

In his attempt to facilitate the administration of

the Carey act in Montana,

to maintain the integrity of the

Commission and to remove any suspicions of favoritism in
choosing Carey Land Act districts,

Rickards appointed

commissioners who had no connections to irrigation
enterprises.^
Each of the five Commissioners served a six-year term,
and the law maintained that the board would be "non
partisan, " so "not more than three members shall be
appointed from one political party."

As compensation,

each

Commissioner received a per-diem payment of six dollars and
traveling expenses for official duties.

The Commissioners

would receive these payments in warrants drawn from the
state Carey Fund, also created by the law.
"State of Montana, Message of Governor John E. Rickards
to the Fourth Legislative Assembly of the State of Mon ta n a,
(Helena:
State Publishing Company, 1895), p. 19.
^Leslie M. Heathcote,
"The Montana Arid Land Grant
Commission, 1895-1903."
Agricultural History 38 (April
1964), p. 1-2.
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These Commissioners held their first meeting on 9 April
1895 and unanimously elected E.W, Beatty as chairman.

At

this meeting the Commissioners voted to form a committee of
three members to locate lands for Carey projects in the
state and to "temporarily employ competent engineers"

to

examine these areas since Montana did not yet have a state
engineer.

Due to the limited operating budget, the

Commissioners resolved to "practice the strictest economy in
the discharge of their duties," and formed a committee "to
devise some way to raise ready money to carry on the
preliminary work of the commission."

Finally,

the

Commissioners resolved that "until the Board shall have made
a careful examination of the lands susceptible of irrigation
in the State, no contract or agreement for reclamation shall
be entered into."*

This provision would mean little in the

future when the ALGC would be so desperate for outside
investors that it would accept almost any project as long as
someone was willing to fund it.
As early as 4 June 1895,

the Commission began looking

for "parties in the E as t " to back its Land Grant warrants.’
Chairman Beattie expressed optimism about finding investors;
he claimed that the bonds would make a good investment
*Arid Land Grant Commission (ALGC) Min ut es , 9 April
1895.
Montana Historical Society (MHS), Record Series (RS)
31, Records of the Arid Land Grant Commission, 1895-1903,
Box 2, Folder 26.
"E.W. Beattie to J.T. Armington,
31-1-30.

4 June 1895.
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because,

"People who settle upon these reclaimed lands will

succeed and will make their payments promptly; and we will
see to it that we get good people with enough means to make
a good start."®
Optimism notwithstanding,

in his communications with

the Commissioner of Arid Lands in Washington State,

Beattie

admitted that the ALGC was "seriously crippled" by having so
little funding.

"We are doing some preliminary surveying at

private expense," he noted,
unsatisfactory."®

"but at best it will be

In August Beattie complained to F.H.

Newell of the U.S. Geological Survey that the ALGC was
“making very slow progress in our work because of the fact
that it's impossible thus far to find people who will cash
our warrants .
The Commissioners hoped that some of the problems with
the bonds would be solved after the 1896 court decision of
State V. Wri gh t .

1895.

In this case the Supreme Court of Montana

®E.W. Beattie to Hugh L. Cooper, New York City,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

8 July

®E.W. Beattie to L.S. Howlett , Commissioner of Arid
Lands, North Yakima, Washington, 27 July 1895.
MHS, RS 31,
Box 1, Folder 30.
Beattie and Howlett exchanged
correspondence about the progress each state was making in
taking advantage of the Carey A c t . The correspondence began
in July of 1895 when Howlett wrote to Beattie requesting
information on the Montana Carey legislation.
In spite of
this effort by Howlett, the state of Washington never
segregated any Carey land.
Mikel H. Williams, The History
of Development and Current Status of the Carev Act
in Id aho,
(Idaho Department of Reclamation, 1970), p. 13.
^®E.W. Beattie to F.H. Newell, U.S. Geological Survey,
Washington D.C., 8 August 1895. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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decided that the law creating the ALGC "was a valid
legislative act," and declared that the Commission's
warrants were legal.

The Court held, however,

that these

bonds and warrants did "not create a claim against the
s t a t e . A l t h o u g h constitutional,

the ALGC bonds remained

a risky proposition because the state refused to bear any
responsibility for guaranteeing payment on them.
Beatty and his colleagues were not given further time
to work on the problem of luring capitalists into the state.
On 2 April 1897 Robert B, Smith,

the newly elected governor,

requested the resignation of all the board members for
political reasons.

The Commission resigned en masse.

Unlike his predecessor.

Smith appointed several

members who had direct interests in irrigation to the new
commission.”

The most prestigious member of the new

Commission was former Governor of Montana,

Joseph K. Toole,

whose interest in irrigation dated back at least to his
tenure in that office.

In his Governor's message for 1891,

Toole had predicted the advent of federal aid for
irrigation,

and had also warned the state to guard "against

the demands of those who, eager to monopolize our lands,
will doubtless be on hand to urge a hasty and inconsiderate

”State V. W r ig ht , 1896.
31-2-33 .

Copy of decision in MHS, RS

”ALGC Minutes. 2 April 1897.

MHS, RS 31, Volume 2.

“Heathcote, p. 3-4.
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disposition thereof.'""

Toole's wary approach to

reclamation projects put him at odds with other Commission
members who favored a more aggressive irrigation program in
Montana; but, perhaps out of respect for his political
experience and reputation,

these men unanimously elected

Toole as chairman at the first meeting."
In one of the initial meetings,
authorized Donald Bradford,

the Board also

a Helena Democrat whose

irrigation interests included the Dearborn Canal,
"State Desert Land Selections",
contracts,
lands."

to make

to draw up and Sign

and to act as agent to select and segregate Carey

Having one person responsible for these duties

meant that the entire commission did not have to meet to
approve land selections;

it also meant that Bradford was

entrusted with a great deal of personal power to select
sites for Carey projects.
Bradford,

In addition to Toole and

the new governor appointed Thomas Marshall from

Missoula and C.O. Reed from Helena to the Commission.

The

fifth appointee, Armistead H. Mitchell of Deerlodge, died in

"State of Montana, Message of Governor Joseph K. Toole
to the Second Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana.
January 5. 1891. p. 16.
"ALGC Minutes, 8 April 1897
"Ibid,

5 May 1897.
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1898 and Smith replaced him with David A. Cory, a
businessman from Helena.*'
Since all of the Commissioners were from either
Helena or southwestern Montana, people in other areas of the
state feared that their counties might be left out of a
possible Carey land boom.
the commission that,

The Great Falls Tribune reminded

"It should not be forgotten...that

northern Montana possesses some of the very best lands in
the state for irrigation purposes."

Since northern Montana

had no representatives on the ALGC,

the Tribune invited the

Commission members to investigate the irrigation
possibilities in that area, and cautioned it not to
concentrate solely on the southern part of the state.”
Commission failed to heed this advice;

The

the four projects

begun by the ALGC between 1897 and 1903 were all in the
southern part of the state or in Lewis and Clark County

(the

county in which Helena is located).
The Commission began work on developing projects in
1897 with the selection of over 10,000 acres in the Billings
"Bench" area northeast of the city of Billings as the first
Carey district in Montana.”

Although the Commissioners

”Heathcote, p. 3-4.
”Great Falls Tribune, 27 May 1898, p. 2.
”Ibid.
“Benchlands" consist of a "continuous, broad,
and nearly level high pra ir ie ,...which continues to fall
slowly in the same direction." In 1889, engineer H.M.
Wilson asserted that benchlands, such as those around
(continued...)
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believed that they could successfully irrigate the Billings
land,

they encountered problems floating the Billings bonds

because of the vast amount of railroad land included in that
district.’’ Investors worried about the legalities of using
the Carey Act to construct an irrigation system that would
include both federal and private lands.

Even after the

Commissioners sent a test case before the Montana Supreme
Court that ruled that Carey Districts could incorporate
private lands, they continued to have problems convincing
investors to back the p r o j e c t . F i n a l l y ,

in February 1898,

^(...continued)
Billings, were ideally suited to irrigation
because of the
low altitude and rich, deep soil.
Wilson, H.M. "The
Irrigation Problem in Montana."
The National Geographic
Magazine. Vol. II, No. 2 (1889 Reprint), p. 216-17.
^°The land in the Billings Bench District included a
little over 10,000 acres of government land and 15,000 acres
belonging to the Northern Pacific Railroad.
The sections in
the district alternated between federal and railroad land
due to the federal government's policy of granting to
railroads alternate sections of land on either side of the
railroads' tracks.
The government donated this land to
encourage the construction of railroads across the American
west.
The ALGC segregated only the federal lands, but,
since any canal system would have to cross railroad land to
reach Carey land, investors questioned the integrity of the
district.
^^State of Montana v. Arid Land Grant Commission was a
friendly suit initiated by the Commission to establish a
ruling about the ability of the Commission to create Carey
Districts that included privately held lands.
In its
decision, the Supreme Court of Montana decided that the
Commission should be able to establish such districts.
In
the opinion of the court, the A L G C 's purpose was to enter
into contracts for the "benefit of the state" and it was
"evident that the legislative assembly intended to give, and
did give, extensive powers to the commission."
Since almost
any district within the state would include lands claimed by
(continued...)
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the Commission awarded a contract to build the Billings
Project

(District No. 1) to the Reece Brothers of Billings,

the sole bidders on the district.”
When the Commission failed to begin construction on the
Billings project by 1900,

settlers and businesspeople in

that area began to pressure the commission to start work in
the district.

Bradford responded to this pressure by

explaining that the "enterprise is of such magnitude that it
requires a large amount of money,
very hard to sell our b o n d s ."

and for this reason it is

He hinted very broadly to

these community leaders that he hoped that local capital
might help pay some of the construction c o s ts .

Although

local leaders refused to back the struggling project
financially,

they did form an organization,

Billings Club,
area.

the Committee of

to represent the irrigation interests in the

This group advised the Commission that since the ALGC

had proved unable to reclaim the Billings District,

it

should return the land to the U.S. Government, which could

. ..continued)
railroads and other corporations or individuals, the court
concluded that prohibiting the state from segregating the
land "would be to establish a rule that would be detrimental
in the highest degree to the interest and welfare of the
state."
State of Montana v. Arid Land Grant Commission,
February 1898.
Copy of decision in MHS, RS 31-2-33.
^^ALGC Minutes. 21 February 1898.
1899.

^Donald Bradford to E.L. Boardman,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

Billings,
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then open it to general settlement.
club argued,

Private enterprise,

the

could then complete the project.'"

Replying for the ALGC, a pessimistic Thomas Marshall
concluded that the ALGC had "given up hopes of being able to
successfully promote the project" although it had "made
strenuous efforts in this behalf."

Either the project was

"too large or not sufficiently inviting for capital to take
the matter up."“

By the end of 1902 the Billings project

seemed permanently stalled,

and the ALGC appeared ready to

relinquish the district.
Although it had made no progress on the Billings
project,

the ALGC continued to search for other lands to

irrigate in the state under the Carey Act.

Difficulties

within the Commission arose from this pursuit, however, when
at the 14 October 1897 meeting, with Toole absent,

Bradford

introduced a resolution to build a canal near Big Timber in
Sweet Grass County.
this proposal.^*

The Commission unanimously agreed to

On 4 November Toole resigned chairmanship

of the Board to protest the Commission's decision to accept
the Big Timber project.^’

Toole's move may have been

^"Committee of Billings Club to ALGC,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

12 July 1901.

^^Thomas Marshall to P.B. Moss, Chairman of the
Commercial Committee, Billings Club, 19 July 1901.
MHS, RS
31-1-39.
^®ALGC Minutes. 28 October 1897 .
'"Ibid, 4 November 1897.
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influenced by his desire to devote more time to his
preparations to campaign for another term as governor of
Montana, but it also reflected his cautious approach to
reclamation.

Toole continually argued, both as a

Commissioner and later as Governor,

that the ALGC should

proceed slowly in its efforts to initiate new projects.

He

believed that completing a few good projects would be more
beneficial to the state than starting,
many poorly planned irrigation systems.

and not completing,
After resigning as

chairman, Toole remained on the Commission until September
of 1899.

Although he left with kind words,

Toole knew of

the failures of the ALGC, and after his election as governor
he worked to abolish the board.
The Commission elected Thomas Marshall to replace Toole
as chairman.

Later that month the Commission promoted

Bradford to Vice-chairman.

Because Marshall lived in

Missoula, much of the day-to-day work of the Commission fell
to Bradford and later to David Cory, whom the Commissioners
elected secretary in April of 1899.
In spite of Toole's resignation as chairman,

the ALGC

members decided to continue efforts toward reclaiming over
50,000 acres in the Big Timber district

(District No. 2),

but work proceeded very slowly since problems with the
^®Ibid, 2 September 1899.
"®Ibid, 4 November 1897.
30

Ibid,

19 November 1897.
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weather and delays from lack of supplies hindered
progress.

The

Andrew Wormser,

board also had difficulties

convincing

whose Holland Irrigation Canal Company

first expressed interest in the area,
to reclaim District No. 2.

had

to offer a formal bid

The board informed Wormser that

it would accept bids first in June,

then September and

finally in November of 1898; Wormser forgot

to bid the first

two times, and,

other bids for

the district,

since the board received no

it had to keep requesting more bids and

reminding Wormser to file a bid.

Finally in November the

Board awarded the contract to Wormser at $12.50 per acre,
the highest cost allowed by law.
Trouble hit the Big Timber project in 1900 when the
principal backer of the District No. 2 bonds suddenly
died.”

Although the ALGC had already extended Wor ms er 's

starting date for construction,

and had stipulated that it

would not "consider any further request of this kind,
pressure from Cory convinced the Commissioners to extend the
commencement date to 1 April 1901 because Wormser was
experiencing difficulties in locating a new backer for the

”Donald Bradford to W.S. Fortiner,
MRS, RS 31-1-1.

22 December 1897

”ALGC Minutes, 15 November 1898.
"Ibid,

9 May 1900.

34

1 July,

Ibid,

1900.
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enterprise.'®

The Commission later extended this date to 1

July 1901^® and then again to 1 August 1901.

Such an

extension of deadlines would become a standard feature of
the state's actions in Carey districts.

Project financiers

and state leaders continually underestimated the amount of
time and money required to reclaim arid land.

As officials

tried to tighten their control over the projects,

they found

themselves faced with a decision either to accept delays and
extensions or to relinquish the districts.
In the case of the Big Timber project,

the ALGC agreed

to extend deadlines, but demanded in turn that Wormser sell
ownership of the canal and water rights to the Commission
for $100,000 in District No. 2 bonds.®®

The Commissioners

hoped that the transfer of ownership would give the state
more control over the project,

and also give Wormser an

added incentive to complete the canal system:

if the

Holland Irrigation Company failed to reclaim and settle the
land, the $100,000 in bonds would be worthless.

By the end

®®Ibid, 1 November 1900 .
®®Ibid, 27 March 1901,
37

D.A. Cory to C.O. Reed,

14 July 1901,

MHS, RS 31-1-

30 ,
®®ALGC report to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 22 January
1902.
MHS, Manuscript Collection (MC) 35, Montana
Governor's Papers, Agency and Special Subject Files:
Arid
Land Grant Commission, State Engineer, Carey Land Act Board,
Box 175, Folder 12,
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of 1902,

the Big Timber project,

like the Billings district,

remained little more than a hope.
Despite its failures on these two projects,

the

Commission developed an interest in starting a new
irrigation project on the Clark Fork River near the town of
Bridger in early 1899.

The Bridger irrigation project

(District No. 3) began as an optimistic attempt to have
settlers build the canal system themselves;

the contracting

company would pay them in warrants which would be "received
in payment for water rights and for supplies."

The

Commission restricted participants to those settlers who
possessed "a team and scraper" and could support themselves
during the period of construction.

The first year promised

to be difficult, but, as Bradford assured an inquirer from
Wisconsin,

Bridger farmers would be able to put in a crop

within a year.’*

Bradford boasted to a potential investor

that the Bridger project was "the first instance in the
histoz-y of the country where a State has undertaken to put
settlers upon the land and give them employment,

so that

they could be supported during the first year or two of
residence on the l a n d ."

Bradford equated the terms of

payment as actually being a seven percent loan on the water
rights payment

1899.

’*Donald Bradford to Frank Vanderob of Wisconsin,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

1899.

““Donald Bradford to J.E. Forrest of Chicago,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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Unfortunately for the Commission and for the settlers
who had come to Bridger expecting to begin work on a canal
system,

the Commissioners did not have a financial backer

for District No. 3.

Bradford and the other Commissioners

had proceeded with plans for the project based on a
agreement signed by A.H. Withey, a secretary of Butte Copper
King W.A. Clark.

On Withey's assurances,

the Commissioners

believed that Clark would agree to finance the project and
then relinquish control of it to the settlers upon payment
of the bonds.

But, on his return to the state, Clark

refused to honor his secretary's a g r e e m e n t . B r a d f o r d and
the Commission were unable to attract another backer,

and

the settlers who arrived were left idle and waiting for
direction and materials to begin bu ilding."

Clark

continually avoided meeting with the ALGC to discuss the
matter, which left Bradford anxious about the state of the
project and about the settlers who had already arrived.
"These people are p oor," Bradford wrote to Wethey,

"are they

to be sacrificed?
As negotiations dragged on, the Commissioners could do
little more for the settlers than encourage them to "keep a
^‘State Examiner W. Hudnall to Governor Joseph K. Toole,
"Report of State Examiner.
Report on State Arid Land Grant
Commission."
23 January 1903.
MHS, RS 31-2-36.
1899.

^^Donald Bradford to Frank Banderob,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

''Donald Bradford to A.H. We they,
31-1-30.

Bridger,

2 8 June

30 June 189 9.
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stiff upper lip" and assure them that the “canal will be
constructed“

By mid-1900,

at least one settler's lip had

unstiffened enough to start a lawsuit against the Commission
in an attempt to force it to begin construction.
informed of this action,

When

Bradford responded angrily,

"You

went down there with your eyes open and should not now
undertake to lay the blame upon me.
impatience."^®

Just corral your

This reaction contrasts sharply with

Bradford's early contentions that the Board was "acting for
the engineers and settlers.

It was easy for Bradford to

advise patience; he had not moved to the state with the
expectation of being able to put in a crop on irrigated land
within a year.

These settlers had already sat through one

growing season;

if work on the project did not begin soon,

they would lose another entire season.
on this project,

Work never did start

and in its 1902 report,

that it had abandoned the project

the ALGC stated

"because of difficulties

t h a t . . .arose.
Faced with the failures of these three attempts to
irrigate land under the Carey Act, the ALGC turned a hopeful
'“‘Donald Bradford to D.H. Brooks,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

Bridger,

*®Donald Bradford to E.M. Strife,
1900.
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

Red Lodge,

"®Donald Bradford to A.H. Wethey,
31-1-30.

3 0 June 18 99.

1902.

■
‘"ALGC report to Governor Joseph K. Toole,
MHS, MC 35-175-12.

19 July 1899.
19 April
MHS, RS

22 January
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gaze toward the Dearborn Di strict.

The ALGC learned of the

Dearborn land because of Bradford's interests in it.
Bradford had filed on 300,000 inches

(7,500 cubic feet per

second) of Dearborn River water on 18 July 1888.

Later

that year he had conveyed this water right to the Dearborn
Canal Company.

The trustees named in the company's articles

of incorporation included Bradford and Henry Semple Ames,
assistant trust officer of the Mississippi Valley Security
and Trust Company of St. Louis.

The St. Louis company later

purchased the entire project and administered it through
Ames.

Original work on the system included the construction

of a dam and the building of the upper section of the ditch,
but work had ceased in 1890."’

For ten years the project

remained stalled, a victim of poor economic conditions in
the state following the Panic of 1893.
irrigation system possessed no value,

Since an incomplete
the trustees needed to

find a way to complete the project or lose their investment.

"’The "inch" has been replaced by the acre-foot as the
standard unit of water measurement.
"The 'inch' was the
amount of water that could be delivered through a hole, one
inch square in a vertical board dam under a certain
pressure, varying in different localities... A second foot is
one cubic foot of water every second." An acre-foot is the
amount of water needed to cover an acre of land to a depth
of one foot.
State of Montana, First Biennial Report of the
State Engineer and the Carev Land Act B oard. (Helena :
Independent Publishing Company, 1904), p. 17-18.
"’State of Montana, Second Biennial Report of Carev Land
Act Board and State Engineer. 1905-1906. (Helena:
Independent Publishing Company, 1906), p. 11.
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When the ALGC advertised for sealed bids "to construct
water systems to irrigate and reclaim" the 36,000 acres of
the Dearborn district

(District No. 4) in late 1900,

the

Mississippi Valley Security and Trust Company, which
controlled all the water in the district,

safely offered the

sole bid to reclaim the Dearborn area at $12.50 per acre."*
Because construction of the Dearborn canal system had
begun a decade earlier,

the Commissioners hoped that this

project would begin operations almost immediately.

These

hopes seemed realized in October of 1901 when the
Commissioners prepared a large ceremony to celebrate the
completion of the upper section of the Dearborn Canal and
the reclamation of almost 11,000 acres.

The Commissioners

invited Governor Rickards and other prominent men from
around the state to view the October 5 festivities,

"This

being the first Irrigation Canal owned and operated by a
state on the American Continent..."®^
In spite of this apparently auspicious beginning of the
Dearborn project,

the ALGC soon began to encounter serious

difficulties keeping settlers on the land.

Although the

Commission received numerous inquiries about the land and
its potential,

settlers refused to stay in the district.

®°ALGC Minutes. 1 November 1900.
^'Second Biennial Report.
1901.

1905-1906. p. 12.

“D.A. Cory to Governor John E. Rickards,
MHS, RS 31-1-31.

1 October
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Engineer George E. Wickes,

the supervisor of the project,

reported that "great unnecessary outlays" and "gross
missmanagement

[sic]" had characterized the project in the

past,” and Marshall expressed apprehension over allegations
that the Commission had issued to the Dearborn Canal Company
bonds out of proportion to the work d o n e .
A later report by a special investigator from the
Interior Department concluded that, without an extensive
reservoir system,

the water supply was not sufficient to

irrigate properly the 10,104.03 patented acres in the
district,

and that the Dearborn Canal Company had

constructed only one small lateral to carry water from the
canal to individual tracts of land.

Without laterals,

the

canal water did not benefit the settlers because they could
not get that water on their land.*®

When the state

conducted a survey of the Dearborn land in 1904, it found
only two settlers residing there*®; this was three years
after state officials celebrated the opening of this area to
settlers and Commission Chairman Marshall had predicted that
the district would soon be "teeming with the multitudinous
“George F. Wickes to D.A. Cory,
RS 31-1-28.
“Thomas Marshall to D.A. Cory,
RS 31-1-29.

17 January 1902.
22 January 1902.

MHS,
MHS,

**E.A. Keyes, Special Agent, to Secretary of the
Interior, 20 November 1909, Forwarded to Governor Edwin
Norris.
MHS, MS 35-201-12.
*®First Biennial Repor t. 1903-1904, p. 27.
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hum of an industrious community."^"

Although it appeared to

be an example of a successful operation,
project,

the Dearborn

like the other three irrigation districts,

actually reclaimed very little,

if any,

had

land by the end of

1902 .
Although the ALGC had segregated land in four districts
in Montana,

it failed to construct a working irrigation

system on any of them.

Toole argued that the Commission had

spread itself too thin in starting so many projects instead
of concentrating on one and finishing i t .

But Commission

members felt that it was not that the ALGC had overextended
itself, but that it could not obtain adequate funding for
any of the districts.

As Marshall complained,

the ALGC had

been "born and set adrift without food or clothes," so the
commission had to rely on its own attempts to interest
financiers in ALGC bonds.*®
Rickards' Commission,

Like the members of the

the Smith appointees repeatedly tried

to convince potential backers that the ALGC bonds were a
good and sound investment opportunity; but the example of
failed irrigation bonds in California continued to hurt
these efforts.

At least one potential investor demanded

certification from an engineer on the amount of water
available for a project,

since "$25,000,000 have been lost

*''Thomas Marshall to D.A. Cory,
RS 31-1-29.
1902.

15 November 1901.

*®ALGC Report to Governor Joseph K. Toole,
MC 35-175-12.

MHS,

2 2 January
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in California canals on account of insufficiency of water
supply.

In response to these complaints. Commissioner

Bradford argued that such a loss would not occur in Montana
because the Montana laws were "passed with a full knowledge
of the California statutes and their effect."

Montana bonds

constituted a lien on the land and were secured by the
improvement created by the expenditure.

If the principle

were not paid, then the mortgage could be foreclosed."®

But

financiers were not willing to risk their investments in
irrigation projects that had a history of failure unless the
state agreed to guarantee their interest payments.
Board members agreed that a state guarantee would
vastly improve their ability to obtain financing for the
bonds.

If the state would guarantee the interest on ALGC

bonds, Cory predicted,

"we would have had fully half a

million acres reclaimed and settled."

He added that

although the Carey bonds were a good proposition,

"investors

seem to want better security than land and water rights.""'
Large investment institutions, Reed reported, refused to
touch the ALGC bonds;

"they prefer," he stated,

"to have

their funds lie idle in the vaults than to take these bonds

"C.O. Reed to D.A. Cory,
1899.

19 May 1900.

MHS, RS 31-1-26.

"“Donald Bradford to A.D. Mahon of New York, 20 June
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

“D.A. Cory to C.E. Wentland of Denver, 5 October 1900.
MHS, RS 31-1-30,
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at any p r i c e . T h e

legislature continually refused to add

such a guarantee to the ALGC bonds.

Although many state

leaders recognized the benefits of irrigation,

they wanted

it achieved at no cost to the state.
In an attempt to offset the ALGC's inability to
guarantee investment in the projects, the Commissioners
issued the bonds on Districts No. 2 and 4 at the highest
price permitted under the state Carey law, $12.50 an acre.
According to the provisions of the act creating the State
Arid Land Grant Commission,

issuing the bonds a t ’$12.50 per

acre meant that, on average, each acre of land with
perpetual water right in these districts would have to be
sold for $15.00 to meet the contractor's price plus the
twenty percent the Commission deposited in the state's fund
for Carey projects.

In addition, each year the average

price per acre would increase by six percent to cover the
interest on the bonds.

The Commission raised the price per

acre to the maximum allowed to attract investors; but the
increased price meant that Carey settlers would have to pay
more to purchase the land and water rights.

Although

examples from Idaho showed that farmers were willing to pay
up to $25 per acre for irrigated land with water rights.

'C.O. Reed to D.A. Cory, 8 May 1901.

MHS, RS 31-1-26
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they were not as willing to pay such high prices for Montana
land that was not fully irrigated/'
Upon assuming the governorship in 1901, Joseph Toole
began to investigate the ALGC more thoroughly and discussed
repealing the legislation creating the commission/'

He

asked State Examiner W. Hudnall to examine the operations of
the ALGC*^ and in November of 1901 requested from Marshall a
"full and complete report" of the commission/*

In his

Governor's message of January 1901, Toole had little
positive to say about the Commission.

Toole stated that

although the ALGC had segregated four districts in Montana,
"it does not appear from any information at hand that any
land has ever been reclaimed."

He argued that although

Carey enterprises had the potential to be of great benefit
to the state, he wanted the Commission to refrain from
trying to start so many different projects and instead
"In 1903 Idaho began construction on the Twin Falls
South Side Project, the largest Carey Act project in the
nation.
The contracting company had "little difficulty
attracting settlers, who paid $25 an acre for water rights."
Dunbar, Robert G ., Forging New Rights in Western Water.
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 41.
Other projects in Idaho and Wyoming were not always so
successful, but the price paid per acre at the Twin Falls
project demonstrates that good irrigated land in the region
commanded high prices.
*“D.A. Cory to C.O. Reed, 14 December 1900.
1-30 .
1901.

MHS, RS 31-

"State Examiner W. Hudnall to D.A. Cory, 13 November
MHS, RS 31-1-39.

"Governor Joseph K. Toole to Thomas Marshall,
November 1901. MHS, RS 31-1-39.
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"concentrate its energies towards getting some material
results from one or more of the schemes said to be under
way."

Toole recommended that the state prohibit the ALGC

from starting any more new projects and permit it to work
only on those projects already inaugurated,

“and such of

these only as in justice and fair dealing under contractual
relations ought to proceed to completion
In response to this and other attacks on statesponsored irrigation projects and the ALGC, Donald Bradford
contributed an article to the Great Falls Tribune in
December of 1901 defending the Commission and extolling its
contributions to the state.

Bradford argued that irrigation

projects were better left to the states.

If the federal

government were to control these projects, he argued, the
big cattle ranchers would take advantage of the opportunity
to control even more water and land than they already had;
ranchers had done just that under the federal Desert Land
Act of 1877.

An even greater expansion of grazing lands

would be disastrous for the state, since large ranchers
opposed the population growth that Bradford and others
favored as a way to increase the state's wealth.

Bradford

claimed that "home rule" was best for Montana, and stated
that the ALGC had already made a "beginning" in that
direction.

The ALGC, according to Bradford, had

"constructed a system of canals... as comprehensive and as
Great Falls Tribune. 9 January 1901, p. 1 and 3
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scientific as would the government."

He further asserted

that the ALGC rules provided "absolute justice" in
distributing water at a minimal cost.

All that Bradford

asked from the government was for it to lend its credit to
guarantee irrigation district bonds.

Bradford and the other

Commissioners had often argued that if the ALGC bonds were
guaranteed, then they would sell easily and the state could
initiate a multitude of successful irrigation projects.'®
Bradford failed to admit the patent failures of the
Commission or to acknowledge that although ALGC rules
provided “absolute justice" in water matters, no Carey
settlers had yet received any water from the Commission's
projects.

Bradford's position revealed his ignorance of

irrigation engineering and expressed the commonly held
belief that building canals and reservoirs meant nothing
more than digging a ditch or throwing up a dam.

"There is

no great mystery attached to the building of canals and
reservoirs...," Bradford informed the Tribune's readers,
"The land is here; so is the water and reservoir sites can
be found in every coulee and depression in the mountains."'®
But Bradford failed to add that most of the sites that
could be easily irrigated had already been reclaimed.
Fellow Commissioner David Cory had admitted to an inquirer a
month earlier that the Commission had experienced problems
'®Great Falls Tribune. 22 December 1901, p. 11.
'®Ibid.
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because,

"all the land capable of inexpensive irrigation has

been t a k e n , T h e

extensive reservoirs and canal systems

needed to reclaim the remaining arid land had to be
carefully designed and constructed; such efforts would
require more work and money than implied by Bradford's
casual statement about filling coulees with water.
Bradford, the official entrusted with the most authority for
initiating Carey projects in Montana, underestimated the
amount of time and money needed to reclaim arid districts
because he continued to follow this simplistic view toward
the construction of irrigation systems.
In the ALGC report to Toole in January of 1902,
Marshall outdid Bradford in extolling the tremendous
opportunities available to the state through the Carey A c t .
The Commission, Marshall wrote,
making homes for the masses,"

"has begun the great work of
Marshall admitted that the

ALGC had only made a beginning in its quest to reclaim
government land, but put much of the blame for its slow
beginning on the legislation creating the commission.

The

legislature, he complained, had given the commission
the semblance of power and opportunity for good, but it
was only the semblance of power and opportunity,
because no funds were placed at its disposal and only
the running streams and dry prairies were given it as a
basis for credit with which to build great canals and

"'D.A. Cory to John R. Commons, N.Y.,
MHS, RS 31-1-30.

19 December 1900
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resevoirs [sic] and reclaim vast areas for the support
of hundreds and thousands of souls."'
According to Marshall, if given the proper power, the ALGC
could fulfill its promise and help the state enter a new era
of prosperity.
In spite of his flowery rhetoric and overly optimistic
view of the potential for Carey projects, Marshall made a
strong point.

The legislature had created the ALGC to

perform miracles at almost no cost to the state.

The state

wanted irrigated land and prosperous farmers, but state
officials did not want to pay for the process of obtaining
them.

The ALGC officials had to face the humiliation of

being continually rejected in their attempts to secure
financing from outside sources for their projects.

This

rejection had resulted in the acceptance of several illplanned, ill-surveyed projects simply because someone had
expressed a willingness to invest in them.

Considering the

limitations of the Carey legislation in the state, it is
surprising that the ALGC managed to interest anyone in these
projects; it should not be surprising that these weaknesses
prevented the projects from succeeding.

Although Marshall

overestimated what the Carey Act could do (none of the
Western states ever patented the full 1,000,000 acres
permitted them), he had observed that other states, such as
Wyoming and Idaho, were able to make the act work and

1902.

"'ALGC report to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 22 January
MHS, MC 35-175-12.
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correctly argued that the weaknesses of the Commission
resulted from the deficiencies of the state law.

If Montana

wanted to reclaim land under the Carey Act, it would have to
provide more support for the Arid Land Grant Commission.
Although most continued to maintain an optimistic view
of their work, some Commissioners did admit to the
limitations of their work.

In September of 1902, when the

Commission was facing investigations by Toole and State
Examiner Hudnall, Cory lamented that although "Considerable
work could have been done" by the Commission with a little
more cooperation from the state, the "government scheme for
building reservoirs for reclamation of our arid lands is
really the proper one and I think the only practical one for
reclaiming the millions of acres of now almost valueless
l a n d s . C o r y realized that in comparison to the huge
amounts of money that the federal government could pour into
reclamation projects, the efforts of the ALGC to create a
few small irrigation systems seemed feeble at best.

Toole

and his administration were left to determine the fate of
the Arid Land Grant Commission and the Carey Land Act in
Montana.

■'^D.A. Cory to C.B. Guittard, Assistant Librarian, Ohio
State U ., 15 September 1902. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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Chapter 3
The Carey Land Act Board,

1903-1965

Although the ALGC had failed to reclaim any land in
Montana, State Examiner Hudnall and Assistant State Examiner
F.H. Ray both advised Governor Toole to maintain some state
agency to take advantage of the Carey Act.

They did,

however, recommend changes to make that agency more
effective.

Instead of abolishing the ALGC entirely, they

advised Toole, the state should improve the Commission to
make it more efficient and less costly.

Ray argued that,

"The future of Montana, her growth in wealth and homes,
depends first and most on the development of her
agricultural resources and that means irrigation."

Since

Montana was "only one of sixteen" states included under the
Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, it "ought not depend
entirely on National aid."

Ray compared Montana's Carey Act

efforts to those of Wyoming and Idaho; these states

41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
possessed "less natural advantages" for irrigation, yet were
continuing to benefit from the Carey A c t .Hudnall's report concluded that the ALGC suffered from
a lack of funds and want of a state engineer.

The primary

problem with funding came from the unwillingness of the
legislature to appropriate money for the Commission and the
reluctance of private investors to buy the ALGC bonds.
Hudnall suggested that state officials be included as board
members to eliminate salary costs and most travel expenses."
Like Ray, Hudnall pointed to the examples of Idaho and
Wyoming to show that the Carey Act could work; both rejected
Toole's tentative plan to end completely the state's
attempts to irrigate Carey land.
In 1903, the legislature repealed the law that had
created the Arid Land Grant Commission and replaced it with
legislation establishing the Carey Land Act Board (CLAB) and
the Office of the State Engineer.

The legislature created

the CLAB to administer the Carey Act within Montana and
included as permanent Board members the State Engineer as
chairman, the Secretary of State and the State Examiner.
The law specified that the state would not pay these Board

‘F.H. Ray, Assistant State Examiner, to Governor Joseph
"Proposed Water Right and Irrigation Code.
Being
a part of the supplement to Report of the ALGC."
20
December 1902. MHS, MC 35-175-12.
K. Toole,

"Report of State Examiner W. Hudnall to Governor Joseph
K. Toole, 23 January 1903. MHS, RS 31-2-36.
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members any additional salary for their Carey duties, but it
did allow for the payment of travel expenses.^

In March,

the Governor appointed John W. Wade as State Engineer at a
salary of $2,500 per y e a r .'

Secretary of State George M.

Hays and Examiner Hudnall joined Wade as the first members
of the Board.
Initially the powers of the Board were very limited and
confined primarily to supervising the projects begun by the
now-defunct AL G C .^ These limitations reflected Toole's
belief that the State should complete the districts already
segregated before it attempted to initiate more Carey
projects.

Since it could not begin any new projects, the

CLAB had to focus its attention on the Billings, Big Timber
and Dearborn Districts.
Like the previous legislation that created the ALGC,
the new act specified in several places that the new Board
could not create any debts that the state was obliged to
pay.

As originally established, the Carey Land Act Board

^According to the legislation, the State Engineer was
to be appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate ;
he served a four-year term.
Rules and Regulations of the
Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana, 1909, p. 7.
^Governor Joseph K. Toole to State Engineer John W.
Wade, 7 March 1903. MHS, MS 35-201-10.
^First Biennial Report. 1903-1904, p. 19.
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would simply complete the ALGC contracts still outstanding
and "protect the State's interest.""
Reacting both to the failures of the ALGC in its
efforts to initiate large irrigation projects and the new
competition from the federal government, the Board members
decided to concentrate on small,

isolated tracts of land,

"each too small too [sic] engage the Government service, so
that the Government will not undertake their reclamation.
These comparatively smaller tracts are logical fields for
State enterprise.

The CLAB members realized that they

could not compete with the Federal Government and its easy
payment terms for settlers on Reclamation land, so the Board
could not afford to attempt the construction of large
projects.

But, as the Board pointed out, national funds had

already been allocated for the Milk River project in
Montana; since the government had to spread its efforts
across all the arid states, Montana was not likely to
receive any new projects for some time.

Thus, the state

needed to look to the Carey Act to increase irrigation in
the state.®

®Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act Board,
1909, p. 7-8.
’Report of CLAB to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 30
November 1904, p. 10-11.
MHS, RS 32, Records of the Carey
Land Act Board of the State of Montana, Box 3, Folder 23.
’First Biennial Report, 1903-1904, p. 30.
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In 1905, the state legislature increased the Board's
powers.

Most notably it gave the CLAB the authority to

enter into new contracts to reclaim and to settle Carey
lands.

The legislature also added limitations to the act to

try to force the Board and its contracting companies to
complete all projects in a reasonable amount of time.
new legislation stated that,

The

"No contract shall be made by

the Board which requires a greater time than five years for
the construction of the works, and all contracts shall state
that the work shall begin within one year from the date of
contract, and thereafter to be prosecuted diligently to
completion."®

If a company failed to begin construction

within the specified time or in accordance to the contract,
the State could declare the contract null and void.

The act

also specified that, although the contracting company would
maintain and operate the irrigation system during the
settlement process, when 90% of the perpetual water rights
in the project had been sold, the construction company would
transfer the system to the settlers and others who owned the
water rights.’®
One of the most important changes the legislature made
in the state Carey legislation was in the method of payment
for the irrigation systems.

The legislature did not permit

®Rules and Regulations of the Carey Land Act B o a r d ,

1909, p. 11.
"Ibid.
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the CLAB to issue bonds or warrants to support its projects.
Attracting investors for the irrigation projects was left to
contracting companies; it was no longer part of the Board's
duties.

But the legislature did give the CLAB the

responsibility of paying off the ALGC debt.

The authors of

the 1905 law estimated that the ALGC owed $5,707.65 to the
state and $18,697.45 to bondholders.“

They assumed the

Board would use the money brought in through the sale of
Carey lands to pay CLAB expenses, settle the ALGC debt, and
create a fund to reclaim other arid lands.“
The 1905 law set the price for Carey land at a minimum
of fifty cents and a maximum of two dollars and fifty cents
per acre.

It also stated that every application for entry

had to be accompanied by a contract for perpetual water
right for those acres and the maximum price per acre of the
water right had to be included in the contract under which
the project would be constructed.

The contract also had to

state the amount of water the canal company guaranteed for
each water right share purchased by the settler.

In most

contracts the water share entitled the purchaser to 1 1/2
acre feet for each acre with a water right.

If a settler

failed to make proper payments for the water right, the

“These figures on the ALGC debt do not include the 6%
interest attached to the bonds; the interest accrued from
the date of issuance.
Rules and Regulations of the Carey
Land Act Board. 1909, p. 16.
“Ibid.
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company selling the water right had a first lien on the land
and could foreclose on it.

The act also permitted the CLAB

to set other terms of sale,

and to lease Carey land,

provided "that such occupancy shall not preclude any person
desiring to settle upon such lands from doing so at any
time.
Board members were optimistic about their new duties
and responsibilities.
years,

Citing the results of the past two

in which considerable progress had been made in the

construction of the Billings Bench project,

the Board

concluded in 1906 that it was "entirely practicable, and
even desirable,

for the State to continue to avail itself of

the privilege" of the Carey Act."®
Governor Toole continued to work closely with the Board
until February of 1908, when, citing ill health, he resigned
from office and was replaced by Lieutenant Governor Edwin
Norris of Dillon.

In his statement of resignation, Toole

reflected on the changes that had occurred during his tenure
in office, including the advances in reclamation and dry
land farming,

"making homes for thousands and adding

millions of dollars annually to our permanent wealth.""*

""Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act B o a r d .

1909, p. 12-13.
"“Ibid,

p. 16.

"^Second Biennial Report,

1905-1906, p. 3.

"*The Helena I n d e p e n d e n t , 2 February 1908, p. 2.
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Although Norris lacked Toole's intimate experience with the
ALGC and CLAB, he also took an active interest in the
state's Carey projects.

During his six years as governor,

Norris helped to guide the CLAB and to defend it against
critics .
There were many critics of the Board in its early
years.

Like the Arid Land Grant Commissioners,

the CLAB

members were often so intent on creating viable irrigation
projects that they permitted applications on land that could
not be easily irrigated, and allowed continuous delays on
the part of construction companies.

Their desire to prove

the new Board a success led the CLAB members to accept
excuses and extend deadlines that made the Board look
incompetent, or at least unsuccessful.

The problems of the

Dearborn Project illustrate well the difficulties
encountered by the Board as it struggled to construct viable
and profitable irrigation projects under the provisions of
the new state laws.

DEARBORN PROJECT
When State Engineer Wade accepted his new duties, he
conducted investigations of the Carey projects begun by the
''A Great Falls Tribune story, written the day after
Norris' death on 25 April 1924, praised Norris for helping
Montana make the "transition from an era of 'wide open
spaces' to an agricultural state." According to this story,
Norris, who served as governor from 1908-1913, played a
"vital part in establishing the state in its new sphere."
Great Falls Tribune. 26 April 1924, p. 1.
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ALGC.

After Wade presented his report on the Dearborn

District to the Governor, Toole expressed outrage and
denounced the "discreditable conduct in the irrigation
project."
rights,

This conduct included the overpricing of water

the overissuing of bonds, and the failure of the

construction company to build laterals to carry water from
the main canals to individual tracts of land."®
Representatives of the Dearborn Canal Company,
especially Henry Semple Ames, conducted a spirited defense
of the project through letters and two days of hearings
before the Board.

Board members and Ames argued extensively

over the definition of reclamation, the necessity of
laterals, and whether or not the Board should accept the
work done on the district.

When Ames decided to pursue the

issue in court, Wade scathingly condemned the Dearborn Canal
district as "a disgrace to the fair name of our State.""® In
its Biennial report published in 190 6, the Board recommended
legislative action,

"whereby all proceedings in the District

No. 4, known as the Dearborn Canal Scheme, be declared null
and void.

Governor Toole agreed with this conclusion.""

"^Governor Joseph K. Toole to CLAB, 3 0 March 1904.
MC 35-201-10.
"^Second Biennial Report.

1905-1906, p . 9 .

''Ibid, p. 28.
'"Ibid, p. 26.
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In spite of all its angry rhetoric, however,

the Board

eagerly accepted an offer from Ames to draw up a new
contract to reclaim the Dearborn District.

Faced with the

prospect of losing over 30,000 acres of Carey land, the
Board decided that it would be worthwhile for the state to
give the Dearborn Company one more chance.

The Board had

not yet completed a project, and the Dearborn district still
seemed tantalizingly promising.

In an abrupt about-face,

the Board reported in 1908 that the new plans for the
district appeared "good and sufficient" to settle the area
during the year 1909.
Board stated,

"There now seems little doubt," the

"that the District will soon be a settled

community.
This optimistic statement provided an interesting
contrast to an allegation by the Board just two years
earlier that it was "impossible for the State to complete
the reclamation of said l a n d s . T h e

Board members, and

especially State Engineer Wade, still hoped for the best out
of the Dearborn district.

They continued to feel pressure

to produce a successful project.

By 1909, Montanans were

enthusiastically supporting the dry land farming movement,
which threatened popular support for irrigation projects.
From the Board members' actions,

it would appear that the

^^Third Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the
Carey Land Act Board, 1907-1908. MHS, RS 32-3-23.
^’CLAB to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 2 November 19 05,
MHS, MC 35-201-10,
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CLAB was so anxious to prove its legitimacy that the members
were willing to take chances that in 1904 they had decided
not to risk.
The Board even contested an extremely negative report
on the Dearborn District submitted by a special agent of the
Department of the Interior.

The Board assured Governor

Norris that "it never has before been questioned nor in the
slightest degree doubted that this project is feasible.
Instead of proceeding with plans to cancel the project,
Norris and the Board asked the Department of the Interior
for deadline extensions in the District so the Dearborn
Canal Company could complete its w o rk .

The Board then

accepted two transferrais of ownership of the canal project
before it finally voted to void the construction contract in
1910 .
Frustrated with its continued failure to reclaim and
settle the Dearborn lands, the Board eventually concluded
that it would be best for the state to relinquish all the
lands in the district.

In its Fourth Biennial Report,

the

Board explained its reasons for relinquishing the lands as
well as its previous reluctance to make this final decision.
This Board has been exceedingly loth to take this
stand--thus possibly shutting the door of opportunity
in our faces which seemed fully open to us to place
^^CLAB to Governor Edwin Norris, 25 October 1909,
MC 35-201-12.
^^CLAB to Governor Edwin Norris,
MC 35-201-13.

5 January 1910.
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upon this splendid tract of now desert land a community
of prosperous and happy farmers, and thus bring to the
State a great and permanent benefit.’"
Although reluctant to part with the lands, the Board
decided that the Dearborn fiasco had tainted the efforts of
the state to irrigate lands in Montana through the Carey
Act.

Since the CLAB was beginning to receive some positive

recognition for its progress in the Billings and Big Timber
districts,

it did not want the negative publicity

surrounding the Dearborn project to tarnish its new image of
success.

The Board may also have simply been tired of the

Dearborn District.

For over 10 years the state had pursued

the elusive dream of reclaiming 33,000 acres in the Dearborn
Valley; the CLAB finally decided the effort was not worth
the sacrifice.

But through its experiences with District

No. 4, the Board, the Governor and the state legislature
became aware of the larger problems with the state's Carey
legislation and began work to change the law to make it more
effective.

By 1912, the legislature had made significant changes
in the Board.

These changes reflected some of the lessons

learned from the experiences with the Dearborn project.
Although the State Engineer remained as an adviser to the

^®State of Montana, Fourth Biennial Report of the State
Engineer and of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of
Montana. 1909-1910. {Helena:
Independent Publishing
Company, 1910), p. 7.
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Board,

the Governor replaced him as chairman in order to

allow the engineer more time for field investigation of
irrigation projects-

New legislation also removed the State

Examiner, who usually possessed little expertise in
irrigation matters,

from the Board and replaced him with the

State Attorney General, a person qualified to interpret
contracts and water laws.
The Board also took steps to maintain more control over
Carey projects in an attempt to check abuses by contracting
companies.

"The principal reason for the difficulties of

the past," the Board admitted,

"seem [sic] to have been lack

of experience and precedents in the operation and
administration" of the Carey Act.

The rules were strict

enough, but the actual operation of the Board was lax; the
Board had not adequately investigated the lands to be
segregated.^’ A more intensive investigation of the
Dearborn lands, for example, would have alerted the state at
the beginning about the difficulties of irrigating that
area.

As part of its new program the Board began to

relinquish lands, such as District No. 4, and to reduce
materially the acreage of other projects "to conform to the
probable water supply available for reclamation."

Taking

such strict measures to maintain feasible projects at

^’State of Montana, Fifth Biennial Report of the State
Engineer and of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of
Montana, 1911-1912, (Helena:
Independent Publishing
Company, 1912), p. 234.
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reasonable prices would serve notice to others "that
dilatory tactics would not be countenanced, but projects
must be taken up in a businesslike manner and pushed to
consummation with all due diligence or the segregation would
be cancelled."^®
In its Fifth Biennial Report, the Board noted the
cancellation of the Dearborn Project
Red River Project

(36,586.42 acres), the

(7,885.52 acres) and the Franklin Project

(5,142.30 a c r e s ) A l t h o u g h it continued to carry several
other non-productive districts,

the Board's willingness to

relinquish segregated lands reflected part of a new
commitment to feasible projects.

Part of the lesson of the

Dearborn project had been learned.

The Board realized that

not every site in Montana could be profitably irrigated and
not every company would perform its irrigation duties fully
and honestly.
But, again, the Board's rhetoric was more impressive
than its actions.

Although it did cancel three projects in

1911 and 1912, it carried other "non-quiescent" projects for
several decades before finally relinquishing them.

In spite

of its expressed determination to cancel projects rather
than to allow their construction deadlines to be extended
indefinitely,

the Board continued to permit extensions on

all of its remaining projects.

The CLAB extended one

''Ibid.
"Ibid,

p.259
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district's deadline for completion by almost 40 years.

It

was easier to discuss terminating projects than it was
actually to cancel the segregations and to lose the
opportunity of creating successful, prosperous districts.
Every acre less than the 1,000,000 acres offered to the
state under the Carey Act that the state did not irrigate
and thus obtain from the federal government, was seen as
lost land.

Reports of successes in Idaho and Wyoming also

contributed to the desire of Montana officials to take
advantage of the government offer.
After the demise of the Dearborn District, Board
members continued to extend deadlines, but tended to focus
more attention on those projects that showed real progress
toward construction of viable irrigation systems.

Most of

the CLAB papers after 1910 deal with the Valier and Billings
projects, both of which succeeded in reclaiming land and
selling that land and water rights to "actual" settlers.
The CLAB's first triumph came on the Billings Bench project.
The Billings success justified the Board's existence and
proved that Montana could build a working irrigation system
under the Carey Land A c t .

BILLINGS
The Billings Bench project

(District No. 1) became the

first Carey Land Act project in Montana to be completed
'First Biennial Report,

1903-1904, p. 30
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successfully and transferred to the water users of the
district.

In 1903 the CLAB signed a contract with the

Billings Land and Irrigation Coir.cany.'*

Under this

energetic company, construction of the irrigation system
progressed rapidly.

By 1905, the Billings Land and

Irrigation Company had completed construction of a 1,847foot tunnel, a 900-foot flume, and almost 100 miles of
canals and laterals.
Trouble arose on the Billings Bench District, however,
when that project neared completion and negotiations began
for the transferal of the irrigation system to the water
users of the area, who, according to the dictates of the
law, had formed the Billings Bench Water Users Association
(BBWUA).

In 1908 these water users hired a former Montana

State College professor and engineer, E. Tappan Tannatt, to
examine the project in preparation for the transfer of
ownership.

Tannatt discovered serious problems with the

system including seepage and "dangerous and inadequate"
wooden headgates.

He advised the BBWUA to demand an

immediate examination by the State Engineer and to "insist
that he require the company to live up to its promises and
plans."

Tannatt seemed to trust the State Engineer and

“CLAB Minutes. 20 June 1903.
^^Second Biennial Report.

MHS, RS 32-3-21

1905-1906, p . 5.
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recommended chat the Billings settlers rely on Wade to
remedy the alleged problems.'"
District settlers expressed concern when apprised of
Tannatt's report because they did not want to pay for
construction errors in the system that, they assumed,
construction company should remedy.
assumed control of the project,

the

After the settlers

they would have to pay all

maintenance and repair costs; if they could force the
company to improve the system before the transfer, they
could avoid the payment for these improvements and repairs.
Learning of Tannatt's report. State Engineer Wade
assured the settlers that "both contractor and settler shall
have, at our hands,

simple justice."

He promised that the

Board would protect the settlers "against mistakes
inadvertent, or frauds intentional on the part of the
contracting company. " To Governor Norris, however, Wade
suggested that some of the settlers' complaints were
unwarranted.

"I feel," he wrote,

"that the whole matter of

“E. Tappan Tannatt, Engineer, to J. T. Connall of the
BBWUA, 5 September 1908. MHS, MC 35-202-4.
According to
the Methods of Procedure published by the CLAB in 1909, the
policy of the Board was "to faithfully protect the interests
of the settler with proper regard to the rights of the
contractor." Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act
Board, 1909, p. 18.
’^State Engineer John Wade to W.M. Johnson, Attorney
from Billings, 7 November 1908. MHS, MC 35-201-11.
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their complaints arises from their lack of knowledge of
irrigation; this a little time will help."’^
After conducting his own "careful review...of the
@r%tire line and of all the works of this irrigation system, "
Wade described Tannatt's report as a "merciless and
unprofessional attack,"

Wade accused Tannatt of reporting

only what the BBWUA wanted him to report.

According to

Wade, Tannatt's only motivation to produce the condemnatory
report on the Billings project was financial.
Predictably, the Billings settlers reacted with anger to
Wades' conclusions.

They expressed suspicion that the chief

engineer of the Billings Land and Irrigation Company, who
lived in Washington State, had accompanied Wade on his
inspection.

Wade had not informed the BBWUA of his

examination, so no representative of the settlers was on
hand.

This, the settlers argued,

right to us."

"does not look exactly

Their lawyer informed Governor Norris that,

"I may say that Mr. Wade admits that he is prejudiced in
favor of the Company, and his actions certainly show that
this is true."”

After this negative report, the Billings

“State Engineer John Wade to Governor Edwin Norris, 7
November 1908. MHS, MC 35-201-11.
“State Engineer John Wade to CLAB, 23 November 1908.
MHS, MC 35-202-4.
”W. M. Johnson, Billings Attorney, to Governor Edwin
Norris, 3 December 1908. MHS, MC 35-201-11.
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settlers communicated directly with Norris, rather chan
going through either Wade or the CLAB.
Billings settler L.W. Burg wrote a personal letter to
Norris relating stories of district settlers who were unable
to obtain water from the project.

He told of Ennis Gill,

who had been "trying for three years to get a crop."
lived "about 12 miles East of billings

Gill

[sic] and faithfully

put in a crop each year, with a promise of water, he has had
a hard row to ho e . ..he has done all on his part, but lack of
water has been his undoing."
rending, " Burg wrote,

It was "certainly heart

"'to see the field all tilled and an

effort made for a crop, with nothing to show for the farmers
[sic] efforts, except a blighted crop, all for the lack of
water."

Burg accused the Billings Land and Irrigation

Company of providing some farmers with water, because that
"was necessary so as to have a sample to show prospective
easy marks, so as to sell more land.
It is not clear what impact Burg's sad story had on
Governor Norris, but Wade continued to favor the Billings
Land and Irrigation Company against the attacks of the
settlers and Tannatt.

In his next report to the CLAB on the

Billings District, Wade clearly sided with the contracting
company against any criticisms of the engineers sent by the
CLAB to inspect the project.

In spite of some criticisms

'®L.W. Burg, Billings Settler, to Governor Edwin Norris
17 May 1909. MHS, MC 35-201-12.
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from one of the inspecting engineers, Wade concluded that,
"it is manifest that ... no call for other or extra work or
for any sort of emendation can be made upon the company.
Wade continued to fight the settlers over the condition
of the Billings irrigation system.

Tannatt swore to Norris

that he would fight to his last dollar to expose Wade,

"as I

feel that it is but justice to the citizens of Montana and
to my profession that men of this stamp and disposition be
publically [sic] known and understood."

The CLAB had

already preferred charges against Tannatt with the State
Board of Education.

In return, Tannatt, who stated that he

had received "outrageous treatment" from Wade in Billings,
vowed to file charges with the legislature against Wade for
"improper official conduct and for incompetency.
Wade's refusal to consider the settlers' complaints was
the result, perhaps, of his almost fervent dedication to
irrigation.

He believed that only through irrigation could

Montana prosper.

Wade's convictions may have colored his

judgement in the Billings District.

It seems probable that

Wade became convinced that he had to support the
construction company because that company had built a
successful project.

The CLAB found it relatively easy to

find farmers who wanted to purchase irrigated land; the
^’State Engineer John Wade to CLAB, 25 October 1909.
MHS, MC 35-201-12.
*°E. Tappan Tannatt, Engineer, to Governor Edwin Norris,
21 November 1910. MHS, MC 35-201-13.
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Board members found it much more difficult to find a
competent irrigation company to build a relatively sound
canal system.

Wade sided with the company that had helped

him toward the achievement of his goal--the creation of
irrigated farmland in Montana.

He was willing to dismiss

the complaints of the project's farmers who could not
appreciate how difficult it had been for the state to build
a successful irrigation system under the Carey Act.

The

almost total lack of concern shown by Wade for the
complaints of the settlers demonstrated clearlywhere his
sympathies lay.
Wade supported the benefits provided by the Billings
Bench project as depicted by the Billings Land and
Irrigation Company in the 1910 CLAB Report.

In the pro act

summary provided for the Biennial Report, the Billings Land
and Irrigation Company extolled the success of the Billings
District.

"Here, where six years ago was a desert covered

with sage-brush...giving sustenance to nothing except a few
sage hens and jack-rabbits, there is now a thriving
community of prosperous and happy farmers.”"

The farmers

in this district had paid over $15,000 in taxes for the year
of 1910, and, the company estimated, the project had added
three million dollars in taxable wealth to the city of
Billings and had doubled the city's population.

The company

reported that it had sold 5,985.13 acres of the project to
^Fourth Biennial Report.

1909-1910, p . 4.
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"actual settlers, " who were "more than ordinarily prosperous
and contented."

The project was almost complete,

except for

some "small ditches and laterals. " This report fulfilled
many of the hopes of the Board and Wade for a successful
irrigation district that contributed to the economic
prosperity and stability of the state.

Faced with the

seeming culmination of his wishes, it is hardly surprising
that Wade chose to believe the construction company that had
provided this boon to the state.
In early 1911, Wade's second term as State Engineer
ended and Norris appointed Archibald Mahon to succeed him.”
The biennial reports of the Board and State Engineer do not
relate if Wade decided not to continue as State Engineer or
whether Norris asked him to resign, but pressure from
Tannatt's suit and hostility from the Billings settlers
probably contributed to Wade's decision to leave his
position.
After seven years of fighting, the Billings Land and
Irrigation Company and the BBWUA finally reached an
agreement in 1915 "for the turning over of the canal to the
water users.""*

The Merchants' Loan Company of Billings

accepted trusteeship of the project until its completion.

"Ibid, p. 3-4.
"^Fifth Biennial Report,

1911-1912, p. 10.

"R.E. Shepard, President of BL&I Company, to State
Engineer Archibald Mahon, 8 May 1915. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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and arranged with the BBWUA that the settlers would
"maintain, operate and improve the canal as required by the
State.

The Billings Land and Irrigation Company agreed to

complete the canal while the water users operated the
system.

The CLAB could not officially recognize this
however, until it had accepted the entire project

as complete; until then it continued to hold the Billings
Land and Irrigation Company responsible "for the faithful
fulfilment of their contract."*®
Bank officials experienced the same difficulties with
the water users as had the construction company.

Only a few

weeks after the Billings bank assumed the trusteeship of the
project, one of the bank officers informed Mahon that the
Board would have to act quickly to "take the Ditch off our
hands."

The officer had apparently already become the focus

of settler abuse.

He wrote to Mahon that "the only solution

to the matter is to have the ditch in the farmers [sic]
hands to stop their numerous complaints."*®
The Bank had to suffer these complaints until 20
December 1920, when the state relinquished control of the
Billings District to the BBWUA.

To this date the district

had segregated 13,223.54 acres, had colonized 12,264.62

*®Seventh Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of
the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana. 1915-1916,
(Helena:
Independent Publishing Company, 1916), p. 80.
*®Roy J. Covert, Merchants Loan Company, to State
Engineer Archibald Mahon, 27 July 1915. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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acres, and irrigated annually 17,000 acres of crops on Carey
Act land and non-Carey Act land.
been expended on the project.'"

A total of $504,000 had
By 1926, the Billings

project was providing water to 18,000 acres of diversified
crops,
grains.

including sugar beets, beans, alfalfa and small
The BBWUA reported that the "Billings Bench is rn

the best condition of its history, as most of the poor
farmers have been weeded out and the project is now being
farmed by industrious farmers who know their trade and are
making a success of their endeavors."**

Only 857.85 acres

of Carey land remained unsold in the district by 1927.**
The Billings Bench project provided the CLAB with a
clear success story.

In spite of problems with the transfer

of land from the construction company to the settlers, the
irrigation system had passed into the hands of the water
owners.

Settlement of the project was almost complete, and

the project provided water to over 18,000 acres of land near

*"Tenth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the
Carey Land Act Board, 1921-1922, p. 15. MHS, MC 35-202-2.
The Billings Bench project provided water to all the Carey
land settlers and also to settlers on non-Carey lands. When
the ALGC segregated the district, it had to contend with
privately held lands in the area and agreed that the
Billings Land and Irrigation Company could sell excess water
to farmers on these lands as long as it did not take away
from the guaranteed water rights of the Carey settlers.
'^Twelfth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of
the Carey Land Act Board, 1925-1926, p. 12-13. MHS, MC 35202-2 .

**CLAB to E.E. Tiffany of Billings, 25 August 1927.
MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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Billings,

directly improving the prosperity of that c i t y .

The project also illustrated how difficult

it could be for

the CLAB to reconcile the desires of both the settlers and
the construction company in the matter of the transferal of
the irrigation system.

The Board experienced similar problems a few decades
later on its largest irrigation district.

Although

construction on the Valier project began in 1909, the
transfer of ownership in the project did not occur until
1953.

A larger district than the Billings Bench project,

the Valier project also experienced a more prolonged period
of development and suffered through an even more tumultuous
period of transferal of ownership than that experienced in
the Billings area.

But, like the Billings project, the

success of the Valier district showed that in fertile areas
with easily accessible water Carey projects could succeed if
the companies building them could secure the money to back
them.

VALIER PROJECT
In May of 1909, the Board entered into a contract to
reclaim what would be its third successful district, the
Valier project.

The contract also established the Teton

County Canal and Reservoir Company, a settlers' corporation.
When the CLAB accepted the Valier system as complete and 90%
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of the water rights to the district were sold, the
construction company had to convey the entire system to the
Teton County Canal and Reservoir Company.

Stock in this

company consisted of water rights; the water right to one
acre of land constituted one share of stock.

All works on

the project were "subject to approval" of the Carey Board,
which had to accept the system in its entirety before the
transfer to the settlers' corporation.^®
The contract for the district experienced numerous
revisions, most of which were extensions of the deadline for
completion of the system and colonization.

The first

contract of 1909 required that the construction company
complete building in 1912 and settle the land by 1916.''
Later contracts extended the deadline eventually to 1951.
The Board also authorized increases in the price per acre
for water rights from $40 in 1909, to $50 in 1912, $60 in
1918, and $80 in 1921.”

The Board granted these

modifications for various reasons that included the
bankruptcy of the company and colonization difficulties

“Conrad Land and Water Company Contract, 23 July 19 09
MHS, RS 32-3-7.
“Ibid.
“The Valier Company argued that it needed to increase
the price of water rights to $80 an acre, "for the reason
that the cost of constructing and completing said irrigat ion
Project is far greater than was originally anticipated at
the time the foregoing Contracts were executed." Petitioon
of The Valier-Montana Land and Water Company to CLAB, 1
December 1920.
MHS, RS 32-3-13.
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caused by World War I.

Again,

the CLAB demonstrated its

willingness to ignore the intent of Carey legislation in the
state and its own regulations about deadline extensions in
order to continue to hold onto a potentially successful
district.
The various construction companies on the Valier
project experienced financial difficulties primarily because
of problems with colonization.”
water rights to settlers,

With insufficient sales of

the companies found it difficult

to retire the project's bonds.”

Company leaders complained

about the "menace" of federal reclamation projects, which
competed for settlers.

Even when it did attract settlers,

the construction companies often found that these farmers
knew little about irrigation agriculture; many of them
defaulted on their settlement payments.”

Several times,

the company requested the CLAB to send warning letters to
settlers who were delinquent in making their final proofs.
One report acknowledged that, "In securing settlers no
“The company constructing the Valier project underwent
a variety of name changes.
The company was first called the
Conrad Land and Water Company, then the Valier-Montana Land
and Water Company, The Valier-Montana Land and Water
Company, and finally in 1944 it became The Valier Company.
“State Engineer C.S. Heidel to Francis A. Silver,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, 25 August 1926. MHS, RS 32-2-27.
“This was not uncommon among farmers on new irrigation
projects.
F.H. Newell, head of the Reclamation Service from
1902 to 1915, observed that most irrigation farmers were
"'inexperienced' or 'adventurers' who expected 'easier
things.'"
Donald Pisani, "Reclamation and Social
Engineering," p. 58.
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attention was paid to the colonists'

former occupation,

and

it took longer to convert bookkeepers, clerks, dentists,
into good farmers than had been anticipated."-’

etc

In 1926,

company officials reported that 30% of its settlers had not
made payments over the last three years, and 58% had paid
less than $5.00 an acre during the last three years.
Without a firm policy dispossessing these delinquent
settlers, the company could not bring in enough money to
satisfy its bondholders and complete the project.®’ The
project ran at an operating loss of $35,000 in 1925.
By 1926, company officials wanted to complete the
project as quickly as possible and turn it over to the
Pondera County Land and Irrigation Company, the successor to
the Teton County Canal and Reservoir Company.
running out.

Time was

Investors had to be paid, the physical

structure of the project was "rapidly deteriorating", and
maintenance costs were rising.®*
State Engineer J.S. James investigated the Valier
project in 1930 in response to a request from The ValierMontana Land and Water Company (the third company working
under a CLAB contract to build the irrigation system at
Valier)

for an examination to show that the project was

®*McMi11an-Hawley Report, June 1926. MHS, RS 32-3-15.
J.H. MacMillan, Sr., of Minneapolis, was president of The
Valier-Montana Land and Water Company after 10 August 1926
"Ibid, p. 13.

®*Ibid, p. 12.
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complete according to the contract.

Although James found

some deterioration of the system, he concluded chat if che
company completed a few specific repairs and additional
construction,

the project could be approved by the CLAB.”

In spite of this positive report, by 1 October 1930, The
Valier-Montana Company was in default of its contract for
completion of the Valier p r o j e c t . I n its last meeting for
more than 10 years, the Board met in 193 2 to extend The
Valier-Montana Company's deadline to 1935 for completing the
project.^

After The Valier-Montana Company declared

bankruptcy in 1942, the'CLAB signed a new contract with The
Valier Company to complete the project.
The final phase in the development of the Valier
project began in 1947, when the project's developers,
settlers and engineers fought each other and state officials
over the transferal of the system to the settlers. In that
year The Valier Company asked the local district court to
determine the legalities of the transfer of the Valier
project to the settlers' corporation.

Part of the CLAB's

concern in this matter was the question of land The Valier
’’■Report on Contract Between The Carey Land Act Board
of the State of Montana and The Valier-Montana Land and
Water Company," by J.S. James, State Engineer, 15 April
1930. MHS, RS 32-3-18.
’“State Engineer J.S. James to CLAB, 23 December 1931.
MHS, RS 32-2-30.
“R.J. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State Water
Conservation Board, to Governor Sam C. Ford, 4 September
1947. MHS, RS 32-3-14.
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Company had acquired from delinquent purchasers.

The Valier

Company owned 20,000 of the 70,000 Carey acres within the
district; thus, it controlled almost 3 0% of the stock in the
Pondera County Land and Irrigation Company.

The Valier

Company contended that since these water rights and lands
had already been sold once, they should no longer be subject
to the restrictions of the Carey Act; it also contended that
the sales should count toward the achievement of the 90%
level of water rights sales that The Valier Company needed
to reach before the project could be turned over to the
settlers' corporation.“
The Pondera Company (the settlers' corporation), was
concerned with the system's maintenance.

Company leaders

wanted the State Engineer to report on the construction and
maintenance needed on the project.*^

However, Assistant

State Engineer Oscar Moberg's careful investigation of the
system prompted criticism from both The Valier Company and
the settlers.

The Valier Company, through its lawyer,

Forrest H. Anderson, complained that Moberg was being much
too thorough in his examination, especially since the CLAB
had approved the Valier work once already--in 1932 with the

"Great Falls Tribune, 14 September 1947.
MHS, RS 32-3-14.

Clipping,

"Twenty-Third Biennial Report of the State Engineer and
of the Carey Land Act Board, 1947-48. MHS, MC 35-202-3.
"J.P. Freeman, Attorney for Pondera County Co., to^
State Engineer Fred Buck, 31 October 1947. MHS, RS 32-3-10.
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acceptance of James' report

The settlers also protested

that Moberg was moving too slowly and thoroughly in his
inspection.

Officials from the settlers' corporation wrote

to the CLAB in July of 1949, that "ample time has been
appropriated and used for the performance of the inspection
of the system."

They blamed the Board for the heightening

of tensions around the project caused by "delayed
information."**

The settlers worried that extensive

demands on the construction company might result in another
bankruptcy that would delay completion even further.
Although they appeared to be completely at odds with
each other, both companies wanted the same thing--completion
of the system and its transferal to the settlers'
corporation.

Each appealed to the CLAB to get these goals

accomplished in a way favorable to its side, but protested
if the Board's actions hindered progress toward the transfer
of the system.

Moberg's report, which found fault with both

the CLAB and The Valier Company,
progress.

seemed to endanger that

Moberg blamed the CLAB for extending the deadline

for completion of the project,

"thus making the time for

completion of reclamation and settlement a period of 42
years where four years was originally given and not to
exceed 15 years was intended under the terms of the Federal
“Forrest H. Anderson, Attorney for The Valier Company,
to CLAB, 10 May 1949. MHS, RS 32-3-14.
**J.P . Seifert, Pondera County Canal and Reservoir
Company, to CLAB, 2 July 1949. MHS, RS 32-3-10.
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Carey Act."
stated,

The Valier Company deserved cricicism, Moberg

for creating "a lousy system" that it was trying to

"ram down" the water users' throats.
belief," he concluded,

"It is my firm

"that the present construction

Company (The Valier Company)

is not competent nor in a

position to complete the construction of the Valier
Irrigation Project according to the terms and specifications
of the contract with the State."*’
Pressure from the settlers and The Valier Company
caused Moberg to resign from the investigation in mid-1949.
"It was intimated," he wrote in a statement concerning his
resignation,

"that the report would be so severe in its

requirements on the Valier Company [sic] that the company
would go broke again and would be unable to put the project
in an acceptable condition."**
The Valier Company's engineer, George Ebner, argued
that Moberg gave a "much-too-doleful picture, as to the
maintenance work."**

Reacting to pressure from the settlers

and from The Valier Company to ensure the completion of the
system's transfer.

State Engineer Buck worked with Ebner to

produce a joint recommendation on the project that was less
‘’Statement by Oscar E. Moberg,
32-3-14.

20 July 1949.

MHS, RS

“Ibid.
‘’George Ebner, "Analysis of the Report of Fred E. Buck,
State Engineer, based on the inspection of the Valier
Project by Oscar Moberg and dated September 30, 1949," 11
March 1950. MHS, RS 32-3-18.
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severe in its requirements of The Valier Company than was
Moberg's report.

Buck presented the report to a meeting of

settlers and The Valier Company officials in December of
1950 in Conrad.’" Two years later stockholders finally
approved the agreement reached at this meeting.

The Valier

Company agreed to perform certain construction work and pay
$6,350 in lieu of other work; the Pondera County Company's
acceptance of the money meant the acceptance of the project
as "fully completed.

After forty-four years, the

settlers and the construction company reached an agreement
on the project's transfer.

Although Engineer Moberg had

severely faulted the project,

the water users apparently

were willing to accept what they could get to help construct
some repairs and secure the system under their control.
The question of the extensive shares of water stock
held by The Valier Company was solved when the state
legislature passed special legislation to allow the company
to sell the land and appurtenant water rights.

In June of

19 52, The Valier Company sold 20,699.48 acres of land and

’"State Engineer Fred Buck to CLAB, 8 January 1951.
MHS, RS 32-3-14.
’'"Application of The Valier Company for Acceptance of
Irrigation System for Transfer" to the State of Montana and
CLAB, 30 June 1953.
MHS, RS 32-3-13.
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14,052 shares of water stock.

Nc

:arey Act land remained

for homesteading.'"
On 27 October 1953, Buck called the last formal meeting
of the Carey Land Act Board."'

At that meeting. Governor

Hugo Aronson approved the Board's resolution to transfer the
property of the Valier project to the Pondera County
Company.

This meeting ended the state's involvement in the

Valier project."^

Other CLAB projects were not as successful as the
Billings and Valier districts.

The Board continued to carry

three "non-quiescent" projects

(the Teton, Flatwillow and

Little Missouri Projects) until 1926 and 1931.

These

projects, on which little or no construction was ever
attempted, attracted claims of fraud and scandal and damaged
the developing prestige of the CLAB.

A "real minature [sic]

Oklahoma land rush" started on one project in 1913 as
speculators tried to claim land in the irrigation district.
Local people complained about bribes and kickbacks being

''State Engineer Fred Buck, "Report on the Physical
Condition of the Valier Project," 27 July 1953. MHS, RS 32
3-17 .
"State Engineer Fred Buck to CLAB, 24 November 1953.
MHS, RS 32-3-6.
"CLAB Minutes.

2 7 November 19 53.

MHS, RS 32-3-15.
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used to ensure the purchase of Carey land.
investigation of the project,

in a later

State Engineer Mahon found

that the submitted proposal for the district established
water rights at "almost four times as much as the greatest
flood of record."""
Such an overestimation was not uncommon during this
period.

In his examination of reclamationists in Montana,

Stanley Davison observed that people often exaggerated the
amount of water in streams, especially when influenced by
spring runoffs.

"Even engineers often were misled by the

apparent volume of water, and proceeded with irrigation
works to distribute quantities of water that were not there
except briefly during the seasonal runoff."""

This problem

was exacerbated by the state's failure to compile the needed
data on stream flows and to provide a central system for
filing water rights claims.

" [T]here is scarcely a State in

the arid and semi-arid West," complained Engineer Wade in
1910,

"that is so slow in the compilation of data that is

absolutely necessary to make use of what is not now already
Dunn, Harlowton Businessman to CLAB Secretary
Ray, 5 August 1913. MHS, RS 32-1-2.
"®State Engineer Archibald Mahon to CLAB, 15 June 1914,
35-201-13 ""Stanley R. Davison, "Hopes and Fancies of the Early
Reclamationists." In Historical Essays on Montana and the
Northwest. edited by J.W. Smurr and K. Ross Toole, (Helena;
The Western Press, 1957) . Reprinted in Montana's Past:
Selected Essavs. edited by Michael Malone and Richard B.
Roeder, (Missoula:
University of Montana Publications in
History, 1973), p. 323-24.
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appropriated of these waters."'"

State Engineer Mahon

observed a few years later that demands from the Interior
Department that the state provide water-flow records over a
five-year period on proposed Carey projects hurt the CLAB's
efforts.

Such demands held up irrigation projects because

the state did not have records on most streams.

Mahon

argued that estimates gave "fairly close results" and should
be accepted."*
"Estimates" of stream flow and construction costs,
however, created the biggest difficulties with the
implementation of the Carey Act.

The CLAB had to attract

construction companies and investors into the state to build
the Carey projects, so it had to offer attractive figures
that promised high and quick returns to those who invested
in the ventures.

Underestimating the cost of construction

and overestimating the available supply of water and fertile
land served the initial purpose of the CLAB.

But, because

actual prices of construction were higher and irrigable
acres were less than they had been led to expect, the
investors invariably had to spend more and wait longer to
realize any return on their investment.

Many companies went

bankrupt waiting for their projects to become successful.
Montana also suffered a lack of accreditation procedures for

""Fourth Biennial Report,

1909-1901, p. 17.

’’state Engineer Archibald Mahon to Governor Samuel V.
Steward, 16 October 1913.
MHS, RS 32-1-2.
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engineers.

As a CLAB secretary noted as late as 1940,

"No

law requiring registeration [sic] or licensing of engineers"
existed in Montana.
profession."*®

"Anyone may practice this

Although not qualified to practice

irrigation engineering, project promoters could claim in
their proposals the availability of vast amounts of
unclaimed water in their areas.

The false promises and

history of failed irrigation companies discredited the Carey
efforts and thus made it more difficult for the state to
attract investors .
Although Mahon acknowledged that serious problems
existed on some of the Board's segregations, he reacted
vehemently to any accusations that the CLAB was not acting
in "entire good faith" on the projects.®^

A vocal defendant

of the Carey Act, Mahon extolled the advantages that statesponsored private irrigation could bring to the state.

He

attacked the "present attitude of the Reclamation Service

Tice, CLAB Assistant Secretary, to Henry L. Gray,
Seattle, 14 October 1940. M H S, RS 32-1-14.
*‘This vicious cycle hurt Carey projects throughout the
west, even in Idaho, the most successful "Carey state."
There the general rule was that the final cost of a project
was usually twice the estimated cost.
In addition to the
increased cost of construction, often only one-third of the
acreage originally included in the project could actually be
irrigated. Williams, p. 80-81.
In Montana the problems
were more acute because the state possessed less of the
rich, even land found in southern Idaho that made irrigation
in that area easier and more productive.
®^State Engineer Archibald Mahon to Governor Samuel
Stewart, 16 October 1913.
MHS, RS 32-1-2.
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and the Secretary of the Interior... that private and Carey
projects are not a success."

It was not, Mahon argued,

these private companies could not build the projects,

that

it was

the "heavy over-head charges of the projects that arise from
the slow settlement of the lands and the resulting heavy
interest charges against the investment for construction and
maintenance, without sufficient revenue to support it," that
caused problems for the private c o m p a n i e s W h e n in
competition with the federal projects, private companies,
which could not offer the delayed and low-interest payments
of the government enterprises, could not attract as many
settlers to their lands.

Without fairly rapid settlement,

companies did not receive enough from purchases of water
rights to make their own payments to investors.

Without

continued support from investors, many companies simply
could not afford to complete their projects.

The Billings,

Big Timber and Valier projects in Montana all suffered from
slow settlement due, in part, to competition from federal
reclamation projects.
In addition to competition from the Reclamation
Bureau's projects,

the Carey districts also lost potential

settlers to the dry land farming movement that swept through
the state in the 1910s.

Board members blamed advocates of

“State Engineer Archibald Mahon to "38 Individuals and
Canal Companies," 23 February 1914, Copy. MHS, MC 35-20113 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
dry land farming for slow sales of Carey land after 1909.'-“
After dry land advocates arrived upon the scene,

"instead of

a throng of irrigation farmers coming into our state, as the
Board expected,

the greatest part of the settlers that did

come took up dry land farmxng."’®
Montana experienced a "flood" of settlers between 1910
and World War I, but few of the immigrants settled on
irrigated Carey land.

The new farmers were attracted by

extensions in the Homestead Act, dry land farming
propaganda, and a cycle of above-average rainfall; they
settled on land where they could practice the new
"scientific" form of dry land farming.®*

Irrigation

advocates like Robert Sutherlin of the Rocky Mountain
Husbandman lamented the attraction that the "Campbell
Method" of dry land farming had in Montana.

To the dismay

of irrigationists, even the Agricultural Station that had
been established at Montana State College in Bozeman began

**In an attempt to redeem outstanding ALGC warrants,the
CLAB had raised the price on Carey land from $.50 anacre to
$1.50, but, after brisk land sales in 1908 and 1909
(primarily in the Billings Bench District), the Board was
able to attract few settlers onto Carey lands. CLAB
Assistant Secretary George Davies to Governor Samuel V.
Stewart, 12 December 1914. MHS, MC 35-201-13.
"Ibid.
"Roeder, p. 52.
Hardy Webster Campbell promoted a
system of dry land farming in the 1890s that is named after
him. This system involved the use of deep plowing, light
seeding and summer fallowing.
Grant, p. 299-300.
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sc
to support the Campbell system/'

Everyone seemed to be

abandoning the old Progressive dream of irrigated farmland
for the "get-rich-quick" attraction of dry land farming.
According to historian Richard Roeder, the enthusiasm
for dry land farming in the state was perfectly
understandable;

"the state had between twelve and fifteen

million acres of non-irrigable land most of which could be
farmed successfully under the new methods."”

Cities like

Great Falls fully supported the Campbell System because they
greatly benefitted from it.

Settlers filed 1,100 claims at

the Great Falls land office in the first three weeks of
October,

1909; the Fort Shaw Federal Reclamation Project, 30

miles west of Great Falls, when completed, produced just 206
irrigated farms.”

There was a great deal more business for

Great Falls in dry land farming than in irrigated farmland
because more people could afford the cheaper dry land,
especially since they did not have to spend additional money
to purchase water rights and to pay for canal maintenance.
The dry land farming boom,

fueled by good harvests and

the wartime demands for grain, continued until the droughts
of 1917 and 1918 and the lower grain prices after the war

’"'Grant, p. 323-335,

365.

”Roeder, p. 77-78.
’’Grant, p. 3 92, in footnote 61. Grant also noted that
underfunding of irrigation projects "was a national problem"
during this period.
By 1910, the Sun River Project at Fort
Shaw was only 7% completed, p. 387-89.
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destroyed many of the dry land farmers.'®
drought,

Following the

irrigated farming gained new supporters.

The

drought had several effects on Montanans, according to a
later report of the State Engineer.

People became more

interested in irrigation again as they realized that
"irrigation in some form is generally essential to the
agricultural development of the State."

Montanans,

the

report continued, were no longer interested in getting rich
quickly, but instead wanted to settle and be stable.

They

were "interested in the future of the state" which depended
largely "upon the proper use and development of our water
resources... It has largely been these irrigated acres which
have stabilized our agriculture and helped to carry us along
during these years of drought and depression."’^
Obviously a supporter of irrigation, the State Engineer
exaggerated the influence of irrigation in Montana and the
attitude change in its people.

He correctly noted that much

of the dry land farms in eastern Montana were abandoned to
cattle ranching after the drought years.
part of the state, however,

In the northern

farmers continued to use dry

land farming techniques successfully.

Irrigation was one

part of agriculture in Montana, but not the only, or even

’’Grant, p. 378-380.
According to Grant's research,
Montana suffered the highest farm bankruptcy rate in the
United States in the 1920s. Grant, p. 415-16.
’^Fifteenth Biennial Report of the State Engineer,
32, p. 3. MHS, MC 35-202-2.
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most important, component of agricultural success.

The

engineer was probably reacting to the lack of prestige in
which irrigation had been held during the boom years of dry
land farming in the 1910s.
Even during the lean years of the 1910s the CLAB
managed to remain virtually self-sufficient,*^ but in the
1920s and 1930s, the Board's work slowed down.

The CLAB had

not started a successful Carey project since 1909, and with
the successful transfers of the Valier and Big Timber
projects to the water users of those districts in the 1950s,
the work of the CLAB was almost finished.
Before the Board could end its involvement in the Carey
districts, however,

it had first to ensure that all of the

districts' lands had been transferred from state ownership,
either through sales to settlers or relinquishment to the
federal government.

Based on information from Idaho and

Oregon, the Board decided that,

"if any tract of Carey land

is not reclaimable and subject to irrigation and sold to an
actual settler, the tracts should be reconveyed to the
Government.

"All operating expenses of the Board during this period
derived from land sales and filing fees. The Board made no
appropriations from the Carey Land Act Fund until 1921 when
it withdrew money to pay the Board's expenses.
State
Engineer to State Board of Examiners, 23 June 1923. MHS, RS
32-1-3.
"Memorandum:
Liability of the Carey Land Act Board for
Unsold Tracts of Land.
Copy, no date. MHS, RS 32-2-3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83

Additional difficulties arose over the sale of this
remaining land because it was "marginal."

According to the

Revised Codes of Montana of 1921, the state had to provide
five acres of water rights for each 40 acres of Carey lands.
The CLAB could not "sell any of this land unless it [was] to
be reclaimed by irrigation.

When Frank Van Driest wanted

to purchase some of remaining unclaimed land in the Billings
District in 1948, he found that he would have to pay $35 per
acre for water on the land, even though the assistant state
engineer who examined the area declared that it was "so
small and inaccessible that I would frankly say that it is
not feasible to irrigate."

The engineer asked the board if

it could "possibly close one eye and make the sale" without
the charge for water rights.”

As a representative from

the Billings Bench Water Users Association pointed out, such
Carey lands that were left on the project were "marginal
lands in every sense of the word or they would have been
entered upon years ago...Under these circumstances it seems
highly ridiculous to go through all the red tape and routine
which was formerly required under the Carey Act."”

”CLAB to E.E. Tiffany, Secretary of BBWUA, 2 5 August
1927. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
”Gerald J. Oravetz, Assistant State Engineer, to Buck,
6 April 1948. MHS, RS 32-2-2.
”E.E. Tiffany, Secretary of BBWUA, to CLAB, 8 April
1948. MHS, RS 32-2-2.
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Upon examining these marginal Carey lands, State
Engineer Buck recommended to the Board that they should
"attempt to get these tracts out of the hands of the Carey
Land Board into individual hands and be placed on the tax
rolls."

He figured that the state had a total of 1,160

acres of such land remaining in 11 different tracts.^''

The

General Land Office advised the Board that if "the patented
lands are unsuitable for irrigation and reclamation, the
State may reconvey the lands to the United States."

After

the reconveyance, the Bureau of Land Management would
consider how to dispose of the lands under public land
laws
Even selling the land to settlers presented problems
for the Board.

By 1943, the Board had sold no Carey land

for "some years, " so when Louis Dousman wanted to buy land
in the Billings Bench District,

it took the Board almost a

year to complete the process for the sale, because no one
knew the procedure.**

Once it began actively selling land

again, the Board managed to sell off some of the remaining
marginal lands to settlers who owned adjoining tracts.
Between 1 December 1944 and 3 0 November 1946, the CLAB
’"'State Engineer Fred E. Buck to CLAB, 16 April 1948.
MHS, RS 32-2-2.
**W.O. Hancock, Chief of Branch of Land Disposal
Division of Adjudication, Department of Interior, to Albert
Anderson, Attorney for CLAB, 6 August 1948.
**E.E. Tiffany, Secretary of BBWUA, to State Engineer
Fred E. Buck, 12 July 1943.
MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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]TscQ ivsd $2,664.88 firorn 1and sal ss and o th©ir payrnsnc s ; ic
received $3,329, primarily through land sales, for the
biennium between 1 December 1946 and 30 November 1948.''"
Finally,

in the middle of 1957, the CLAB applied to the

Secretary of the Interior for a quit claim deed to unsold
Carey lands in the s t a t e . I n

early 1958, State Engineer

Buck began to return lease checks to settlers, explaining
that the CLAB had "made application to the U.S. Land
Management Board to transfer all the tracts of land that are
being leased to the State Land D e p a r t m e n t I n
Buck reported to the CLAB members that,

1959,

"We have only a few

tag ends left to clean up the operation of the Carey Land
Act Board.

In January of 1959, the Bureau of Land

Management issued to Montana a quit claim deed to the unsold
Carey lands .
With the relinquishment of these final lands back to
the U.S. government, and the successful transferal of the

‘““Twenty-Second Biennial Report of the State Engineer
and of the Carey Land Act Board, 1945-1946.
Twenty-Third
Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the Carey Land
Act Board, 1947-1948.
MHS, MC 35-202-3.
'C.5. Heidel, Deputy State Engineer, to Mrs. Eva
Junior, Shepherd, 2 December 1959. MHS, MC 32-1-13.
101/

'State Engineer Fred E. Buck to Pete Yegen Jr.,
Billings, 24 February 1958. MHS, RS 32-1-13.
102 t

,
'State
Engineer Fred E. Buck to CLAB members, 9
January 1959. MHS, RS 32-1-13.
103

‘“'C.S . Heidel, Deputy State Engineer, to Mrs. Eva
Junior, Shepherd, 2 December 1959. MHS, MC 32-2-13.
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three projects to the settlers,
completed its duties.

the Carey Land Act Board

In its 1963 and 1965 sessions,

the

legislature repealed the legislation creating the Carey Land
Act Board and the office of the State Engineer.

The State

Water Conservation Board was given many of the State
Engineer's duties,

including that of measuring stream flows

and negotiating with other states on the allocation of
streams.

The legislature provided that the CLAB and State

Engineer would transfer their funds and records to the State
Water Conservation Board.
With very little fanfare (except for the photo
opportunity provided by the meeting to transfer the Valier
Project to the settlers in 1953) the Carey Land Act Board
and the Office of the State Engineer faded out of existence.

'"^State of Montana, Laws and Resolutions o f the State
of Montana pa sse d bv the Thirty-ninth L egislative— Assembly
in Regular S e s s i o n , (Helena:
State Publishing Co., 1965),
Chapter 280, p. 882-891.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion

Progressive reformers and western boosters had pictured
the west as a vast,

fertile plain that needed only to have

water conducted to it to' create a verdant garden.

They

believed, as had Donald Bradford of the Arid Land Grant
Commission,

that there was "no great mystery" attached to

the process of watering the west.

But, there was not enough

water in the west to satisfy everyone's demands.
where water was plentiful,

And even

it was not always easily

accessible.
Carey projects suffered from the overestimation of
available water and the underestimation of the amount of
work needed to put that water onto farmland.

John Wesley

Powell, author of "Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of
the United States," had informed anyone who would listen in
the 1890s that there was not enough water to irrigate all
the land in the west.

But, in their desire to create a

greener, wealthier, more stable region,
to the voice of caution.

few wanted to listen

In 1889, Powell had estimated that
87
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up to thirty-five million acres in Montana could be
reclaimed* through irrigation.

But, he cautioned, such an

©ffott would mean that the state would have to utilize "all
ics waters--it means that...no drop of water falling within
the area of the state shall flow beyond the boundaries of
the state.

It means that all the waters falling within the

state will be utilized upon its lands for agriculture."^
Fifteen years later, Montana State Engineer John Wade
reported that,

"after twenty-five years of travel over this

great State, I am convinced that all our arable lands can be
irrigated--every arid acre that can be utilized for grain or
grass can be reclaimed.

Unlike Powell, Wade did not

elaborate on where all the water to irrigate Montana's lands
would come from; it was just there.

Everyone knew that

there was plenty of water in the west, it only had to be
captured and channeled to the right areas.

Looking at the

Dearborn River during the period of spring runoff, how could
one not believe that this one river could irrigate more than
36,000 acres?

But spring runoffs lasted only for weeks or

days; droughts lasted for years.
Success on Carey projects depended upon how easy it was
to irrigate land in the district, how much capital a company
could obtain to build the irrigation system, and how quickly

'John Wesley Powell, Speech before the Montana
Constitutional Convention of 1889.
In Grant, p. 188.
Tirst Biennial Report, 1903-1904, p. 15.
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fanners settled the land.
interacted.

All three of these considerations

The easier land was to irrigate, the more

likely it was to attract investors because they could get a
faster and surer return on their investments.

when

contractors had enough money to build a solid system, they
could sell land more readily because farmers were more
likely to purchase land in a successful district.

Once an

energetic company began work on the Billings Bench project
and completed some canals and laterals,
the district.

farmers moved onto

Of the more than twelve projects contemplated

by the CLAB and ALGC in Montana, only three were finished.
Each of these successful districts was located on land close
to an easily accessible water supply.
Faced with restricted funds and lack of easily
irrigable land, states did not meet the expectations of the
Carey Act authors.
failure.

But, the Carey Land Act was not a

Although the act never succeeded to its full

potential--no state ever reclaimed the full one million
acres offered by the government--it did offer an alternative
to federal irrigation, and eight western states eventually
patented over one million acres of government land under the
act.

Idaho and Wyoming took the greatest advantage of the

act.

In all, Idaho patented 617,334 Carey acres and Wyoming

claimed 203,311 acres.

The largest Carey project, the Twin

Falls South Side Project in Idaho, irrigated 192,750 acres.
Montana patented the third highest number of Carey acres,
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const rue Ced three irrigation systems under the act that
provided 92,000 irrigated acres for Montana settlersh
Perhaps Montana could have taken greater advantage of
the Carey Land Act.

If the legislature had been willing to

guarantee the interest on ALGC bonds, more financiers may
have been willing to invest in Montana projects.

If the

state had established guidelines for licensing engineers and
spent more money to gauge stream flows, the Carey boards
might have had a better reputation for correct estimations
of the amount of money and time needed to complete projects.
Montana probably could have built more Carey projects if the
state had been willing to support the Carey boards more
fully.

But, new laws, such as the Newlands Act, and new

ideas, like the Campbell Method of dry land farming,
lessened the state's "need" for irrigated Carey land.

If

state officials could increase the population of Montana and
the number of farmers without direct state aid, they would
do so.

Overwhelmed by these other movements, the Carey Act

in Montana gave way to the better-funded projects of the
Bureau of Reclamation and the popularity of dry land
farming.
The great social experiment begun with the Carey Land
Act succeeded in a small part,

but failed to achieve the

sariier Progressive dream of a flowering garden in the
desert w e s t .

Government

^Dunbar, p. 40-42.

land grants could provide the

Gates, p. 651.
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impetus to reclaim some land, but not much of it.

Carey

projects succeeded where the land was good and companies
buiId relatively inexpensive systems.

Even where

Carey projects succeeded, however, the settlers on the land
not the impoverished victims of urban depravity that
the Progressive reformers had sought to help.

Letters of

inquiry about Carey land in Montana came from Minnesota,
Kansas, Nebraska,

Iowa, Colorado.

Carey settlers were

people looking for new opportunities, but they were not the
destitute of the eastern cities.

Indeed, project managers

on Carey districts lamented about problems caused by farmers
unfamiliar with irrigation techniques--imagine their
complaints if city dwellers, with no farming experience at
all, had moved onto these projects.

Progressive rhetoric

aside, Carey Land Act officials wanted hardworking,
experienced farmers on their districts who could make a
quick and steady profit from the land, pay off their water
share purchases as soon as possible, and remain on the land
to increase the prosperity and stability of the district.
Nowhere in the Carey Land Act was there any mention of funds
or programs to move poor people from the eastern cities onto
Carey projects.
Instead of "making homes for the masses," Montana
officials created a few working projects that are now
controlled by the water users and whose land is owned by
family farmers, ranchers and businesses.

These projects
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contribute to the financial stability of the surrounding
regions and provide taxable land for the state.

The state

of Montana, which contributed almost no financing for these
projects,

thus benefitted in a real, albeit small, way from

the Carey Land Act of 1894.
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APPENDIX I
Progress of States under the Carey Act by 1958
STATE

AREA
APPLIED FOR*

O r e g o n .......
791,615
Washington...
155,649,
A r i z o n a ......
31,266
I d a h o ........ 3, 819,181
N e v a d a .......
185,455
U t a h .........
606,704
Colorado
461,707
M o n t a n a ......
609,828
New Mexico...
10,204
W y o m i n g ...... 1, 798, 274
T o t a l s ...... 8,467,834

AREA
SEGREGATED
388,876
13,745.
1,335,767
36,808
141,814
284,653
246,698
7.604
1,396,869
3,852,860

AREA
PATENTED
73,442
617,334
1, 578
37,239
37,706
92,280
4,743
203,311
1,067,635

*in acres
Table 28 in
Lq ..the.An nua l.R.feRQ„r.t.of.iha
Director of the Bureau of Land M ana ge m e n t . 1958.
Reprinted
in Paul Gates, History of Public Land Law Development.
(Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968),
p. 651.
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APPENDIX II
Montana Carey Districts

Valier
Discricc
Great Falls
Dearborn
District
Helena
Big Timber
Bench
District Billings
District
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APPENDIX III
Billings Bench District

@fTHr

5ILLINGS L.VNDaiid IRRIGATION CO*.
Land* and Canal
'iT.I l.ONV'STONE COUNTY. MONT/\NA.

Map in First Biennial Report. 1903-1904.
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APPENDIX IV
Valier District

V A U tR (C orey L o n d A c t ) P R O J t a
«KETCn &HOWWA

A rch Cf. fteservdt*
tn

Twp. ZCU.,R<5 tb

30.000 PC ft

O M rIUTnt'

Oupuyer

R 7 W

MHS,

R 5W

RS 32-3-11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

R

1W

9 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
Published Sources
State of Montana.
First Biennial Report of State EnoinAf^r
— ths— Carey Land Act Board.
Helena:
Independent
Publishing Company, 1904.
S.econd Biennial Report of Carey Land Act Board
sud—
^s Engineer, 1905-1906. Helena:
Independent
Publishing Company, 1906.
Fourth B iennial Report of the State Engineer and
of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana.
1909-1910.
Helena:
Independent Publishing Company,
1910.
Fifth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and
of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana
1911-1912. Helena:
Independent Publishing Company,
1912 .
Sixth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and
of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana
1913-1914■ Helena:
Independent Publishing Company,
1914 .
Seventh Biennial Report of the State Engineer and
of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana
1915-1916. Helena:
Independent Publishing Company,
1916 .
Eighth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and
of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana,
1917-1918. Helena:
Independent Publishing Company,
1918.
Irrigation Law of the State of Montana : The
Carev Act, Report of Arid Land Grant Commission and
Recommendations of Governor Smith Regarding Irrigation
Helena:
State Publishing Company, 1897.
, Laws and Resolutions of the State of Montana
Passed bv the Thirtv-ninth Legislative Assembly in
Regular Session. Helena: State Publishing Company,
1965 .
. Message of Governor John E. Rickards to the
Fourth Legislative Assembly of the State of— Montana.
Helena:
State Publishing Company, 1895.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

• Message of Governor Joseph K. Toole to the Second
Legislative Assembly o£ the State of Montana, January
C
1OA i
■
5. 1891.
________ • Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act Board
of the State of Montana. Helena:
State Publishing
Company, 1909.
Archival Sources
Montana Governors' Papers, Agency and Special Subject Files:
Arid Land Grant Commission, State Engineer, Carey Land
Act Board.
Manuscript Collection 35, Box 175, Folders
10-13; Box 176, Folders 1-2; Box 201, Folders 10-13;
Box 202, Folders 1-5. Montana State Archives, Montana
Historical Society, Helena.
Records of the Arid Land Grant Commission, 1895-1903.
Record Series 31. Montana State Archives, Montana
Historical Society, Helena.
Records of the Carey Land Act Board, 1903-1962.
Record
Series 32. Montana State Archives, Montana Historical
Society, Helena.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Dunbar, Robert G. Forging New Rights in Western Waters.
Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
Gates, Paul W.
History of Public Land Law Development.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1968 .
Grant, Frank R.
“Embattled Voice for the Montana Farmers :
Robert Sutherlin's Rocky Mountain Husbandman."
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Montana,
1984.
Great Falls Tribune.

27 May 1898 :

_________.

9 January 1901: 1, 3.

________ ,

22 December 1901: 11.

_________.

26 April 1924:

2.

1
3s ,Apr.i

1964):

108-117.

The Helena I n d e p e n d e n t .

2 February 1908:

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99
Lee, Lawrence B. Reclaiming the American West: An
Historiography and Guide. Introduction by Paul w.
Gates.
Santa Barbara and Oxford;
ABC-Clio, 1968.
Pisani, Donald.
"Reclamation and Social Engineering in the
Progressive Era." Agricultural History 57 {January
1983) : 46-63 .
Robbins, Roy M.
1776-1936.
1962 .

Our Landed Heritage : The Public Domain,
Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press,

Roeder, Richard Brown.
"Montana in the Early Years of the
Progressive Period." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1971,
White, Richard.
"It's Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own"
A History of the American West. Norman and- London :
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Wilson, H.M.
"The Irrigation Problem in Montana." The
National Geographic Magazine, Vol. II, No. 2 (1889-Reprint): 212-229.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

